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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

IRAQ, IRAN VIE FOR LEADERSHIP IN GULF AREA

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 3 Aug 79 p 27

[Article by Ashraf Hilmi: "Iraq and Iran Vie for Leadership; Baghdad Mobilized Everything To Ensure Uppermost Command; Tehran Took Advantage of Tension To Rebuild the Army"]

[Text] If there are those in Iran who find it necessary for the Iranian Revolution to become a world-wide Islamic revolution, there are those in Baghdad who are asserting that Iraq has the right to lead the Arab world. There is nothing curious about such a firm belief, especially after the abatement of the threat of the Iranian "imperialist" expansion and in the wake of Egypt's preoccupation with its "Israeli" concerns. It is Baghdad which has been upholding the banner of opposition to the Egyptian president and to his peaceful policies. Iraq took measures to proclaim its independence from the Soviet Union--it leveled crushing blows against Iraqi communists, on the one hand, and it tried to request arms from West Germany, France and Spain, on the other. Iraq cooperated officially with the Syrian regime to achieve a confederation between the two countries that would amount to a political and a security power of some consequence in the northern part of the Arabian Peninsula and on the borders of the eastern front against Israel. Iraq expanded and developed its oil exploration activities. It is now quite possible that Iraqi oil returns which were realized last year--approximately 10 billion U.S. dollars--would shrink when compared with returns that may be realized this year. Iraq has abandoned its strict 30-year opposition to the mere notion of peace with Israel out of a desire to have [the freedom of taking] diplomatic action on numerous fronts. Hence it may be said that the political leadership in Baghdad has appeared to champion Arab rights and Arab independence. In addition, Iraqi leaders have called for the achievement of an honorable peace with Israel. This is because the basic problem is no longer that of war or peace with the Israeli enemy, but it has rather become that of coming to an agreement on the kind of peace that all Arabs would accept.

It is not necessary to assume that Iraq's desire to lead the Arab world will clash with the ambitions of the Islamic Iranian Revolution. But the fact is that a number of Iran's neighboring countries--and Iraq is among them--have begun to view political developments in Iran with anxiety and especially

in the wake of the contradictory statements on the Gulf and on some of the Gulf states and islands that were made by Iranian officials. Such confusion and disarray in publicly made Iranian political statements are due, on the one hand, to the incompatibilities between the government's official spheres of authority and those of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, on the other. In a broader sense, this confusion and disarray are due to the more widely prevalent ideological difference over the nature of the Iranian Revolution and whether or not it has local significance or a world-wide impact.

But the problem between Iraq and Iran in particular is two-sided. The first side of this problem is the fact that the two countries have common borders. The second side, which stems from this proximity, involves the problem of the ethnic minorities in Iran and especially the Kurds in the north and the Arabs in the south. All that these minorities have to do is to cross over the borders and come under the influence of the action and reaction theory in a manner that sometimes threatens to be explosive.

The problem of ethnic minorities in Iran has a long history, but among the features of its recent history is that agreement which had been reached between the Iraqi and the Iranian governments in March 1975. According to that agreement Iran promised to stop its support for the Iraqi Kurds in the north in return for the achievement of a final settlement in the dispute between the two countries over the mouth of Shatt al-'Arab in the south. However, subsequent incipient developments disrupted this agreement.

There was intermittent news that a large group of Iraqi Kurds had resumed their military operations inside Iraqi territory in spite of the government's program to relocate and settle the Kurds in new housing complexes. The re-organized Kurdish command thought that engaging Iraqi forces would not lead this time to inflicting punitive measures on Kurdish civilians in their former traditional gatherings. The Kurds of Iraq sought support and backing from the Kurds of Iran and also from the Kurds of East Turkey--especially in the aftermath of the success of the Iranian Revolution. The autonomy requirements of the Iranian Kurds were consistent with the national aspirations of the Iraqi Kurds. This situation filled the border areas with extreme tension between the two countries, and it led early last month to the shelling of six Iranian villages twice by the Iraqi air force. As a result of this action at least 10 people died and approximately 40 were wounded. The Iraqi ambassador in Teheran is reported to have stated at the time that those forays had been brought about by domestic Iraqi affairs. This statement appears to have been a reference to the problem of the Iraqi Kurds.

The success of the Iranian Revolution and the ongoing debate about the imminent proclamation of a new constitution likewise provided the impetus for arousing the nationalist feelings of Iranian Arabs in the south. They had been hoping that the central government would recognize their rights which for too long had been repressed under the Shah's regime. But the Iranian authorities accused Iraq of interference to arouse jingoism among

the Arab minority in the province of Khuzistan, which is known by its Arab name of 'Arabistan. Iranian authorities accused Iraq of providing secure refuge to a number of escaped Iranian generals.

On the other hand Iraqi authorities faced the problem of the discontent of the Shi'ite Iraqis in the south. Shi'ite Iraqis have close sectarian ties with the Iranians. Ayatollah Khomeyni is the source of their inspiration, especially after having spent several years in their midst in al-Najaf before Iraqi authorities forced him to live in exile in France. Official circles in Iraq believe that Khomeyni followers, who /serve as/ his promoters and agitators, were the ones who had tried to create disturbances and unrest in the principal cities such as al-Najaf, al-Kufah and Karbala'. /Officials believe/ that this had been their response to what they were alleging was the material and military support that Iraq had manifested to the people of 'Arabistan. Some western sources stated that the disturbances had erupted about 2 months earlier--or perhaps a little more than 2 months--in the areas near the borders with Iran. This had led the Iraqi army to deploy its considerable force to suppress these disturbances. These sources are saying that thousands of Shi'ites had organized huge marches in the streets of the principal cities and had carried large pictures of Khomeyni, of Bakr al-Sadr and of other religious leaders. It was said that the demonstrators had started fires in government buildings and police stations and had set up roadblocks to impede the progress of Iraqi army tanks which had been sent to quell this movement. These western sources stated that the tanks had opened their fire on the demonstrators and had killed scores of them in several days of street fighting.

It was stated that after Iraqi forces were able to control the situation, they imposed a 24-hour curfew at Shi'ite gathering centers. They surrounded the homes of Shi'ite leaders and imposed conditions on them, the most important of which was the transfer to Baghdad of some religious leaders and their detention there until authorities become absolutely certain that the unrest and disturbances had been terminated. It has also been determined, according to western sources, that some families be relocated in remote areas without their paterfamilias and that the freedom of family members be tied to the abstention of that family's breadwinner from any political activity. It was also said that the authorities had prohibited the Shi'ites from holding public meetings for a certain period of time /and had asked them/ to confine prayers in the mosques to small groups of worshippers.

Assuming that Iraq's charge against Iranian promoters and agitators is a valid one and that they are the source of the disturbances that exist among the ranks of the Iraqi Shi'ites, the capability and the efficiency of Iranians to fan the fires of discontent across the borders may be demonstrated in news that has been relayed about the decisions of Iraqi authorities to recall their military troops from the common borders area in a desire to stop the Shi'ites short.

It is in this manner that the conflict is aggravated between Iraq's effort to lead the Arab world and the effort of the Islamic Iranian Revolution to disseminate its principles across the border.

It is the opinion of some press and political circles that Iraq believes that a flare up of the old conventional Arab-Iranian struggle would be in its best interest. The intensity of that struggle would be in its best interest. The intensity of that struggle had been reduced in the hope of undermining the position of Ayatollah Khomeyni and even that of the center of power, which relies on Khomeyni, so as to cause damage to Iraq itself. On the other hand, Iranians may be inclined to take advantage of the notion of arousing fears of an Iraqi threat in order to try to firmly establish the foundations of domestic national unity. In fact there are those who claim that Iranian propaganda campaigns against Iraq are a prelude to the creation of a suitable climate for rebuilding the Iranian army that was shattered during the revolution.

8592

CSO: 4802

U.S. ANTI-ARAB BOYCOTT LAWS EXAMINED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 22 Jul 79 p 5

[Article: "American Anti-Boycott Laws; Are They Successful in Opening the Way for Israeli Companies To Operate in the Arab Countries?"]

[Text] American firms prior to the issuance of American anti-Arab boycott laws paid little heed to this matter and operated easily in the Arab countries. They were able to submit documents pertaining to exports and shipping in writing in accordance with the Arab boycott laws and its regulations without the objection of anyone in America. However, matters have changed completely in the last 3 years since the American legislation against Arab boycott laws was passed. Perhaps America's political control over the Arabs and Israel's political control over America are what caused those laws to be promulgated.

The magazine NEAR EAST BUSINESS reports that in this regard, the anti-Arab boycott legislation has required American firms to reject Arab trade conditions which make every exporting company deny that goods shipped to the Arabs have any relationship with Israel in full or in part, but it has been left to the companies to say that the goods are of American origin instead of stating that they are not of Israeli origin.

Obviously Israel was not happy with these laws, since they permitted specific exceptions with respect to American companies which operate in Arab countries, and it obtained new legal judgments which did away with these exceptions and closed the door on any American company attempting to escape from the injustice of the anti-Arab boycott laws. A judgment was issued recently pertaining to the Bechtel company, after 3 years of discussion and debate in the federal government, which has become known as the Bechtel decision. It is aimed at denying or retaining an exception to the anti-Arab boycott laws which permitted companies operating in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to be bound by the boycott regulations, i.e., similar laws of the country in which they operated, by virtue of it's being a sovereign country. This meant no exemptions for the American Commerce Department, withdrawal of American firms from Arab countries and excluding them from a huge market. Consequently billions of dollars were lost to other foreign companies, along with the American balance of payments' suffering.

However, the Bechtel decision which was issued this year caused the pyramid to stand on his head, because it bans every American company from using loopholes in and exceptions to the anti-Arab boycott legislation and makes them subject to legal prosecution by the American Justice Department in accordance with this law.

On the basis of this law, any company, and here was meant "Israeli," that has an office or branch in America could take legal action against any American company which submits bids in the Arab countries and excludes it from doing business as a subcontractor on the grounds of the Arab boycott. In order to clarify the legal position stemming from the Bechtel decision, we offer the following hypothetical case:

Suppose company "x" in Chicago signed a substantial contract with Saudi Arabia for \$50 million; hence responsibility for implementing the contract would fall to company x, and after the signing it receives notification from the Saudi government which grants to it the right to choose the subcontractors needed to assist it from a list accompanying the notification.

Naturally the director of x company's branch in Saudi Arabia knows that the list submitted was drawn up in accordance with the rules of the Arab boycott, i.e., the names of the foreign or American companies formally mentioned as non-boycott. All company x in Chicago can do is apply the anti-Arab boycott laws, and at that point it cannot carry out the project because the list is based on the boycott, i.e., it is discriminatory and chooses those who are in conflict with the principles of right, justice, and equality as applied in America. However, the company despite that used to be able to circumvent this legislation by using the abovementioned exceptions. This would permit it to adhere to the laws, regulations and rules of the country in which it operated, but the Bechtel decision now denies it this opportunity. If it used it, then the "y" electrical company in Chicago or Los Angeles which is a branch or office of an Israeli firm in America could bring legal action in federal court against company x, charging it with discrimination for excluding it from consideration when choosing subcontractors to work with it. When the court hears the arguments on the complaint, company y's lawyers will have recourse to the Bechtel decision, and the court will not allow the evidence of company x's lawyers derived from the anti-boycott legislation. The judge will order company x to pay \$150 million to company y in fees, damages, and compensation, i.e., three times the amount of the contract which had been signed. In addition to being fined in this amount, company x must refrain at present and in future from such behavior as this. If matters reach this stage, company x could only withdraw from Saudi Arabia in order to get out from under paying these amounts, even if it loses its good performance deposit.

Although this scenario is hypothetical, nevertheless the scenario is ready for use now in the offices of American lawyers who are waiting impatiently for these problems to occur in order to seek to gain millions of dollars. Even if company y did not take legal action, it could have submitted a complaint to the Justice Department which would at that point become charged with prosecuting the case in court.

The serious thing in the Bechtel decision is that it is retroactive for a period of 4 years back to 1975. That means any American company or Israeli company in America could allege in court that it had been discriminated against in Saudi or other Arab projects. Therefore American companies fear their activities in Arab countries will be lost if the Arabs decide to fight this challenge. The result of these cases will show up in the latter part of the year or in 1980, when the result of the California Bechtel company's appeal to the court of appeals appears and when the result of Congress' reconsideration of the anti-Arab boycott legislation is due.

Therefore we believe that Israel continues to escalate its humiliation of the Arabs by every means so that through these laws it can penetrate into the Arab countries unless the Arabs decide to defend their honor and the higher Arab interests. Perhaps the Arabs will be able to do that by both honest and dishonest means. South Korea and the government of South Africa were able to buy the American Congress which sold its nation's interests and the interests of the world for a handful of money. A commercial system has no value except for payment, for commission, even if it is in fact a bribe.

However, do the Arabs understand that, or does one believe what one wants to believe?

7005

CS0: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SAUDI-SUDANESE COMPANY FINANCES AGRICULTURAL SCHEME

Khartoum THE SUDAN STANDARD in English 12 Aug 79 p 8

[Article by Dina Omer Osmar]

[Text] 80 miles South-West of the Damazine dam lies the site of the half million acre agricultural scheme financed by the Saudi-Sudanese Damazine Agricultural Company.

The Damazine Agricultural Company is a Saudi-Sudanese joint venture with a paid up capital of 3 million Sudanese pounds, of which Prince Mohamed Bin Faisal pays 60% as his own shares and 10% as a donation to the provincial executive council of the Blue Nile province to help the socio-economic development of the people of that region.

Sayed Abbas Abdel Magid Director of the company explained that the company has been given the concession to develop half a million acres of land under rain conditions for the production of cash crops and livestock.

The Company has adopted the phase approach for the development of the allotted land. The period of development of the whole scheme is estimated to be 10 years. The 1st two years are known as Phase 1, which started in the 78-79 season in which traditional crops such as medium-style cotton sorghum and sesame are grown as well, promising crops such as sun-flower soya beans were tried in a pilot manner. The results of the first year of Phase I were very encouraging and very high yields were obtained especially in sorghum and cotton. The 2nd year of Phase 1 is underway now and it is expected that even better results will be obtained in the season 1979-1980.

The phase approved was adopted in order to identify advantages of high inputs and high technology," explained the Director.

The Damazine scheme is characterized by several techniques, adopted for the first time in the Sudan. Firstly deep ploughing in the dry lands to depths ranging between 7 and 9 inches. Secondly commercial use of herbicides in

the rain-lands. Thirdly the commercial use of fertilizers in the rainlands. Fourthly the complete modernization of the sesame crop and lastly the mechanical harvesting of cotton.

Sayed Abbas Abdel Magid explained that by "commercial use" he means that the fertilizers and herbicides are not used on an experimental basis. Apart from the Gezira Scheme which is irrigated land the Damazine Scheme is the only other scheme to use fertilizers and herbicides.

An updated feasibility study taking into consideration the results of the first year of phase 1 was carried out and this study proposed that the project be developed into three further phases. Phase 2 which will start in October 1979 and will lead to the development of 66,000 acres and will last for four years. Phase 3 will last for two years and will result in the development of 70,000 acres. Phase 4 will also last for two years and will result in the development of 70,000 acres.

The Damazine Company has also started on a pilot stage as a first phase of a livestock development trial. This entails the stocking of both cattle and sheep for the project during the rainy season.

A complete survey of diseases and other animal problems was carried out during the first year of Phase 1 and this pilot venture will continue for some time more until a complete evaluation of the development of livestock is started.

The cost of Phase 2 which starts next season is about 32 million dollars and will lead to the development of 35,000 acres of cotton and 35,000 acres of sesame. If promising crops such as sunflower and soya beans and saff flower trial prove technically possible and economically justified they will be included in the cropping mix and in acreage will be related to their economic returns.

Sayed Abbas Abdel Magid also mentioned several problems the scheme faces from lack of infrastructure to lack of skilled labour. The fact that the scheme is situated so far from Port Sudan also causes many transport problems. The situation in the rainy season becomes so bad that we can only reach Damazine by plane demonstrated the Director.

Sayed Abbas Abdel Magid added that the problems the scheme faces are under study during the pilot stage in order that they can be prepared for all the problems likely to crop up, in the future.

Such a scheme which will propel the wheel of development in the Sudan, is a live token of friendship and brotherhood between the Sudanese people and the Saudi Arabians.

The Sudan is rich in agricultural potential. We have abundant arable lands and water. Thus we can offer good prospects for foreign investors.

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

SYRIA-MAURITANIA AIR AGREEMENT SIGNED--Kebir Ould Selamy, director of civil aviation, signed yesterday with His Excellency the ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic to our country [presumably Riyad Ujayli] an agreement between our country and Syria in the field of civil aviation. Under the terms of this agreement, Syrian aircraft will be able to use Mauritanian air space and land at the airport in Nouakchott, as Mauritanian aircraft are permitted to pass through Syrian air space and land at the airport in Damascus. During the signing of this agreement, the two sides exchanged friendly remarks expressing their satisfaction regarding the provisions of this agreement, which is the expression of the Mauritanian and Syrian desire to consolidate the existing friendly cooperation between the two brother countries. It should be noted that this agreement was initialed early this year in Damascus. It was initialed for the Syrian side by Ahand 'Antar, director of Syrian Civil Aviation, and for the Mauritanian side by Kebir Ould Selamy. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 20 Aug 79 pp 1, 8]

CSO: 4400

PAYMENT REGULATIONS SET FOR NEW COTTON CROP

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 11 Aug 79 p 8

[Article by Hasan Salumah: "240 Million Pounds To Buy the New Cotton Crop From the Peasants"]

[Text] It has been decided to fund the purchase of the new cotton crop from the peasants this year to the amount of 240 million Egyptian pounds. It was also decided that the development bank would pay harvest loans of 12 pounds per feddan on the condition that the produce not come from delinquent farmers.

Minister of Agriculture Dr Mahmut Dawud has issued a decree regulating the marketing of the new cotton crop for the 1979-80 season. It includes the following points.

1. Trade in cotton flowers or seeds and summer cotton is forbidden, and the violator will be subject to the confiscation of the cotton and a trial. The agricultural guidance agencies and others are notifying the farmers of the approved harvest and the collection of the cotton in special warehouses at a minimum of 30 qantars each.
2. The agriculture directorates are drawing up production averages for each village according to the actual crop last year, [for comparison purposes] should the producer feel that his crop will be 40 percent more or less than the average village yield.
3. One cotton company is being assigned to each administrative center, and more than one company can be assigned to the large centers. Each governorate will be responsible for supervising and coordinating the transport means in its domain, and the cooperative transport societies cannot be exempted from delay fines. The transport of cotton from one governorate to another is prohibited except under certain conditions.
4. The cotton from each harvesting will be brought in all at once, and the owner will not be allowed to bring it in in more than two batches. The cotton will be weighed the same day it is brought in, and the producer will lose the right to contest the weighing 24 hours after the announcement of the evaluation.

5. The village banks will pay a cash advance, no later than 24 hours after the bringing in and weighing of the cotton, to whoever brings in 40 percent of the average village production according to the value of the cotton. Payment will be 30 pounds per qantar of long staple cotton and 27 pounds for all other types. This advance will be considered the minimum to be paid to the producer.
6. The cotton companies will pay 500 piasters per qantar except for summer cotton and the results of salvaging. This sum will be set aside for building cotton warehouses, and cannot be spent for any other purpose.
7. No cotton will be accepted at the collection center without a statement from the agricultural supervisor of the producing village. If any producer is late in bringing in his cotton, another statement will not be issued until 15 days after the first one expires.
8. The price of seeds and summer cotton will be determined on the basis of 140 piasters per kilogram, the sum to be paid immediately to the producer after the deduction of a 5 piaster commission.

8559

CSO: 4802

PRICE FIXING POLICY SEEN THREAT TO PUBLIC SECTOR

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 11 Aug 79 p 9

[Article by Sharif al-'Abd: "Public Sector Companies Demand a 'Green Light' For Changing Their Prices"]

[Text] Do the prices for the products of some public sector companies correspond to their costs?

The public sector companies say that their products' sale prices have been frozen for years, while the costs of private sector products, raw materials and wages have increased, and that the certain results are losses, which some public sector companies began facing several years ago.

Head of the Technical Secretariat of the Chemicals Sector Engr Salah Rushdi says, "Local prices for many of our products have remained the same and have not budged for seven years, while the prices for corresponding products from the private sector and foreign products have continually risen. Naturally, the result is increased losses for a number of our productive companies which previously realized profits increasing year after year. For example, this year the transport and engineering company's losses amounted to 5 million Egyptian pounds, even though it had previously realized a continual surplus, the reason being that the price of imported rubber tires has risen 20 percent in the last two months, while the prices for the company's tire production have not changed in more than five years. Similarly, we find that for the plastics companies, the prices of raw materials needed for production have risen 250 to 300 percent as a result of rising petroleum prices. In spite of that, the prices for all local plastic products remain as they were, on the basis of the directives of the ministerial production committee. The same thing holds for corrugated cardboard cartons used to package our exports of threads and other products, for the price of an imported carton has risen 150 percent this year, while a local carton is sold for the same old price of 360 pounds a ton. Meanwhile the raw material used to produce it, which is kraft [transliterated], is sold for 400 pounds a ton. Right now, all the producing companies have started to seek aid and demand a review of the prices for selling their products, but have gotten no response from the ministerial committee. This has led to the appearance of a currency deficit in most of those companies which had realized surpluses in previous periods.

"How can we ask these companies to develop their products and stand up to foreign competition in domestic and export markets when their prices are frozen? It is indisputable that when there is a commodity directly relating to the consumer, there must be no hesitation in fixing its price, such as oil, soap, fertilizer and the like, even though its world price rises to such a degree as to exceed the local price many times over. There is no doubt that the upward movement of these goods' prices is unacceptable, because of the increased tribulation to the public. Therefore, the state subsidizes such commodities so as to maintain their price level to keep them within the consumers' reach. As for commodities not immediately bearing on the consumer, there is no justification for strictly freezing their prices as is now being done. For example, it often happens that the price of automobiles rises. What prevents the price of rubber tires from rising? There must be a green light for the producing companies to raise the prices so that they can play an effective role in providing the commodity to the consumer in the required amounts and at a suitable quality level."

President of the National Plastics Company Engr Ahmad Mujahid says, "A huge burden--the need to provide the commodity--rests on the shoulders of the public sector companies, and this naturally requires these companies to launch investment projects to achieve this goal. How can they do so when most of them have begun suffering losses as a result of the price-freezing policy followed in setting prices? Because of the disparity between the sales price and the actual production costs, intervention in fixing the price cannot be objected to in the case of strategic and supply commodities. But as for other goods, their prices must be left to the law of supply and demand, taking into consideration production costs. When we look into production costs, we find that the prices of raw materials for plastic products has risen from \$480 to \$1,300 a ton during the last six months alone. Is this in keeping with the method now followed in fixing prices for plastics products?"

"The price policy now followed threatens all the public sector companies without exception. This policy needs to be re-examined and dealt with quickly. If not, these companies will become totally unable to meet actual needs. No doubt, adjusting prices and increasing them slightly is much better for the consumer than for the commodity to disappear from the market, for bottlenecks to appear, and for the quality to decline."

8559
C10: 4802

EFFORTS BEING MADE TO EXPAND SOCIAL INSURANCE COVERAGE

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 8 Aug 79 p 8

[Article by 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Aql: "Ten Million Citizens To Be Covered by Insurance"]

[Text] It has been decided to introduce amendments to the social insurance law which will lead to the insurance coverage of 10 million citizens by 1980. In addition to those who are already covered, the end result will be the direct or indirect insurance of 40 million citizens, more than 93 percent of the estimated Egyptian population at the end of 1980. Also, close to one million citizens who reached the age of 65 by January 1976 will receive benefits for the first time.

Minister of Insurance and Social Welfare Dr Amal 'Uthman held a plenary meeting yesterday with senior ministry officials to finish discussing the proposed executive measures to implement President al-Sadat's directives to expand the social insurance umbrella to include all male and female citizens of Egypt in cases of old age, disability, illness and death. The minister explained that the president's directives call for insuring all citizens and guaranteeing benefits for everyone who reaches old age or who becomes unable to earn a living, or for the family in case of the death of the head of the family, within one year of his death, so as to achieve the hope for which every Egyptian strives.

The discussions resulted in agreement on a work plan for the coming phase, based on the following courses.

1. Absolute priority will be given to achieving the actual insurance of those subject to the insurance regulations in effect, inasmuch as this is a starting point for the citizen to acquire his insurance rights. In this way the phenomenon of evading and sneaking around the implementation of the social insurance laws can be combatted.

It was also decided to concentrate the insurance agencies' activities on the governorate level, down to the villages, in cooperation and coordination with the social affairs agencies, in order to facilitate the inclusion of those persons subject to the comprehensive insurance law who are not yet insured.

2. The base of beneficiaries of pension regulations who are former government, public sector and private sector employees who left service or died without earning benefits under the former laws will be expanded. As part of this policy, a right to benefits has been created for those government workers and employees who left service without being entitled to benefits. The bill also includes the amendment of some of the rulings of the social insurance law submitted to the cabinet, giving the right to benefits to all those who left service with the private sector, free education and passenger transport companies prior to 1 January 1962.

As a result of this policy, it has been decided to raise the number of persons who are receiving benefits and persons who are entitled to them to 1.75 million citizens by the end of 1980, to whom 4.4 million Egyptian pounds in yearly benefits will be paid that year.

3. The comprehensive social insurance law will be amended so as to ensure that all those who reached the age of 65 or older by 1 January 1976 will be entitled to receive benefits--also widows and orphans whose heads of family died before becoming entitled to benefits. The number of persons who will receive benefits because of this amendment is estimated at about 1 million aged, widows and orphans, besides the previously mentioned 1.75 million citizens.

4. The social insurance law will be amended so as to permit the addition of all those totally or more than 50 percent disabled, as well as the families of prisoners, to those parties benefitting from social insurance benefits. In addition, an effort will be made to pay benefits to all those on the waiting lists.

As a result of the amendments proposed for inclusion in the law, it was decided to raise the number of social insurance beneficiaries by the end of 1980 to about 700,000 widows, orphans, divorced, disabled, and families of prisoners.

8,559
CSO: 4202

AGRICULTURE MINISTRY EXPERIMENTING WITH MECHANIZED RICE PLANTING

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 7 Aug 79 p 7

[Article by Su'ad Abu-Zayd: "The New Method Will Save Seed and Labor and Will Increase the Rice Crop by 10 to 20 Percent"]

[Text] Yesterday Agriculture Minister Dr Mahaud Dawud inspected the mechanized rice seedling experiment which was conducted at the agricultural research center far at al-Jisah.

This experiment was conducted as part of a study of the possibility of bringing in modern technology to mechanize rice cultivation operations, most importantly the planting of seedlings.

The minister said, "This experiment will save a great deal of agricultural labor, since only four workers can plant 10 feddans of seedlings in a single day, whereas manual planting requires from 20 to 25 workers per feddan."

He added, "This experiment is part of the ministry's trend towards a twice-yearly planting of the rice crop. Therefore there is an extreme need to mechanize the planting. This experiment being conducted for the first time in Egypt is the method followed by rice-producing countries, especially Japan and China."

Twenty-Five Kilos Instead of Sixty

One of the most important features of the spread of mechanized rice seedling planting is the savings in seed, since a feddan can be planted with about 25 kilograms of seeds instead of 60 kilograms. This is over and above the savings in land and water needed for the paddies, since a single feddan of paddy is sufficient for seedlings formerly covering 6 to 8 feddans. The increase in the rice crop is estimated at 10 to 20 percent as a result of planting at the right time on organized acreages.

The minister stressed the need for introducing mechanized rice planting operations because of the importance of rice, since the area planted with rice in Egypt each year amounts to about 1 million feddans producing close to 2.3 million tons of short-grain rice, an average of 2.3 tons per feddan. This acreage is concentrated in the North Delta governorates--Kafr al-Shaykh, al-Daqahliyah, al-Sharqiyah, al-Gharbiyah, al-Buhayrah, and Damietta.

Rice acreage increased to 1.3 million feddans after the construction of the High Dam, but it began to decline after 1974 because of a shortage of manpower and rising wages, which forced some farmers to avoid planting rice in preference to other crops.

Delay in Planting Seedlings

This did not only affect the drop in acreage, but was a reason for the delay in planting seedlings and the cultivation of rice on extensive, unorganized areas, which affected the crop. Experiments indicate that there is a difference of 10 to 20 percent between planting seedlings on organized areas at the right time and delayed, unorganized planting. Therefore the rice research section, in co-operation with the engineering affairs and farm equipment department of the ministry, turned to studying the possibility of mechanizing rice planting operations.

8559

CSO: 4802

KHOMEYNI FURTHERS WORLD-WIDE PARTY FOR THE DEPRIVED

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 26 Aug 79 pp 6, 7

[Text] Imam Khomeini has ordered establishment of a party for the deprived (mostazafin) in a bid to encourage the deprived masses of Iran to participate in various policies regarding their own welfare. This party is in addition to the Islamic Republican party which has been formed by the supporters of the Imam and is presently the majority or the ruling party in Iran. While the Mostazafin Party has not yet been established, the Imam has invited all the deprived people throughout the world to join his new party and has stressed that this party would welcome people with any religion. He made his invitation during a meeting with the Muslims from Kuwait in Qom a few days ago. Exclusive sources believe that formation of the new party has the following reasons:

1. The Imam is hoping to have the cooperation and support of deprived people in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and other Persian Gulf nations and through a world wide publicity campaign, gain some support in other countries where there are still many poor people.
2. Having gained the support of poor throughout the world, the Imam would make his position more stable and thus use his popularity as a political weapon in international circles, and perhaps encourage the poor people to stage demonstrations throughout the world in his favour.
3. By giving small financial assistance to the poor people in the neighbouring countries, particularly in Afghanistan, persuade them to rebel against the governments who are not Islamic, while in other Muslim states, induce the poor to ask for Islamic rule.
4. By gaining popularity among the poor in non-Muslim countries, pave the grounds for promoting Islam in those states while encourage Sunni Muslims to be converted into Shi'ites.

5. Encourage the poor Muslims in the neighbouring countries and the Muslim workers working in the oil rich states in the Persian Gulf to support him and the Shi'ite sect of Islam. By so doing, any possible deals made by the former Prime Minister Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar with the governmental officials of the neighbouring countries would also be reduced in importance and his dreams of promoting true Islamic Republic at least in the Muslim countries will come true.

6. To promote true Islam in the world and have it recognised as a most important religion in the world and have it gradually introduced in politics since most oil exporting countries are also Muslim (he has said in one of his recent speeches that he hopes to be able to fly the flag of Islam in all the countries of the world).

CSO: 4920

DR CHAMRAN DESCRIBES POLITICAL CAREER

Tehran ECHO OF IRAN in English 26 Aug 79 pp 12-14

[Interview with Dr. Mostafa Chamran. (Translated from KEYHAN, 18 Aug 79)]

[Text] Dr. Mostafa Chamran, Assistant to the Prime Minister in Revolutionary Affairs, who is currently surrounded by anti-revolutionary forces in the West Iranian town of Paveh and is resisting their attack with bravery, is a personality well known to the people. This interview held by a reporter of the Daily "Kayhan" before Chamran's departure for Paveh, familiarizes the readers with this national figure:

Q: Would you tell something about your life history?

A: I was born in Tehran in 1930 where I completed my elementary and secondary education. Pursuing electromechanics field at Tehran University Faculty of Engineering, I graduated as the top student. Later, I proceeded to the United States on a Government scholarship, where I completed my education at Berkeley University.

Q: When did you start your political activities?

A: My studies at Tehran University concurred with the National Movement efforts for nationalization of the oil industry. I was my class representative and participated in literally all the demonstrations. I actively participated in the 16th Azar demonstrations in which three of my close university friends--Bozorg-Nia, Qandchi and Shariat-Razavi--were martyred. That was why I wrote the most exhaustive article on 16th Azar events that was published under the same title in a U.S. magazine. I must, however, say that my political career began not at the University but at a time when I was just 15 or 16 years of age. I took part in all clashes and protest rallies which happened throughout my secondary and university-level studies. Following the fall of the national government after the 28th Mordad coup, the National Resistance Movement was set up by Ayatollah Taleghani, Eng. Bazargan, Ayatollah Zanjani and Eng. Sahabi. I was one of the active workers in the Movement. I was responsible for the distribution of the Movement's daily "Rah-e-Mosadeq." This was a secret newspaper and anyone

who was caught possessing it was liable to be tortured and imprisoned. Even the students who were found to possess pamphlets were prosecuted. However, we had our own successful plans to distribute the daily in the Tehran University. One of the rare events of my life was to obtain the highest ever grade (a total of 22) from my professor, Eng. Bazargan, at the Engineering Faculty. Thereafter, I was known as a student who broke all the existing academic records at the Faculty. Right from the age of 15, I took part in the Islamic Students' Association where I got acquainted with Ayatollah Taleghani and Eng. Bazargan. I was one of the most favourite students of Ayatollah Taleghani in Hedayat Mosque School. I used to listen to his Qoranic interpretations from that time until I went to the United States. I benefitted in my ideological training from Ayatollah Taleghani and the Islamic Students' Association.

Q: When did you proceed abroad and start your campaign there?

A: I graduated from the Engineering Faculty in 1958. After a one-year teaching assignment in Physics and Chemistry, I proceeded to the United States where I finished my master's course at Texas University within a single year in electrical field. Later, I went over to the Berkeley University and graduated with top honours by getting my Ph.D. in three years.

Q: Were you familiar with Dr. Ali Shariati?

A: I knew Dr. Shariati from Tehran. Since he actively participated in the Islamic Students' Association in Mashad and myself in Tehran, we set up our contact and became friends. The last time he saw me was in 1957 during Dr. Eqbal's Government when, as the result of a nationwide attack launched against the National Resistance Movement, a total of 86 topnotch members, including Professor Taghi Shariati, Dr. Shariati and Taher Ahmadzadeh were arrested and brought to Tehran. I still remember that they had shaved the head of Dr. Shariati and beaten him up severely, since being the youngest among the whole lot, he was able to tolerate these tortures. I saw him before proceeding to the United States.

Q: Did you continue your political activities while in the United States?

A: The first thing I did in the United States was to set up the Islamic Students' Association which was also participated by Sadeq Qotbzadeh and Dr. Yazdi. I was at Berkeley and Qotbzadeh in Washington, but we communicated together. This Association, which still exists, was later also formed in Europe. Our political activities began with the Iranian Students' Association which was set up in Berkeley at the Iranian Cultural House. Later, this Association laid the foundation of the Students' Confederation. Among the members of the Confederation were Qotbzadeh, Barzegar, Ali Fatemi and Ardalen. However, when we left the United States, the Confederation fell into the hands of the leftist elements. The National Front was first set up abroad and later revived in Tehran in 1961.

Concurrently, it was also revived abroad. I was the member of its executive committee, in charge of publications. We used to publish the Front's famous bulletin "Andisheh" in those days. It is significant to note that our organization functioned as the most active and the busiest one during the 15th Khordad events, and used to publish all the news stuff on Iran in the United States apart from the leaflets of Ayatollah Khomeini and other nationalist leaders there.

Q: You referred to your departure from the United States which evidently created a gap in the political current there. Could you tell me the reason for your exit from that country?

A: A sort of qualitative upheaval took place in the mode of our campaign after June 1963. We couldn't be contained anymore by our campaign at the parliamentary level. So we decided to switch over to an armed struggle. Due to this reason, a wide ranging campaign was launched by our friends such as Sadeq Qotbzadeh and Dr. Yazdi. Dr. Shariati, too, was in Europe at that time. The new mode of our campaign was supported and encouraged by a large group of our friends in Iran as well as abroad. Consequently, I accompanied by Qotbzadeh, Yazdi and several other friends, left for Egypt in 1963 where we underwent tough training in guerilla jungle warfare and underground organizational work for two years. However, we did come across opposition and subsequent clashes from some Arab nationalist extremists. We made protests to President Jamal Abdel Nasser on the title of the "Arabian Gulf" and on changing the name of Khuzestan to "Arabestan." Nasser admitted the truth of our case but said that the current of the Arab nationalism was strong enough to be confronted. He lamented the fact that the Arabs were still not aware that such provocations and instigations were made by our enemies to create discord among Muslims. He said the only thing he could do was to allow us to express our views in the hope of enlightening the Arabs on the reality of the situation.

Q: Why did you go to Lebanon, and what were your activities there?

A: We were seeking for a base in the region from where we could give vent to our thoughts and organize our anti-Shah movement. Lebanon was the most suitable place for this purpose as the Shi'ite leader, Imam Mousa Sadr, who was opposed to the Shah's regime, was willing to cooperate with us. Qotbzadeh, too, was acquainted with him. We succeeded in establishing contact with Imam Mousa Sadr. Finally, in 1970, I left the United States with my family and went over to Lebanon.

CSO: 4906

KURDISH AFFAIRS TAKING ON INTERNATIONAL PROPORTIONS

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 26 Aug 79 p 2

[Text] While the Kurdish problem in Iran is getting out of hand, inducing Imam Khomeini to personally handle the situation by proclaiming himself the supreme commander of the joint army staff, reports from Turkey have indicated that the Turkish Kurds are planning to call for an independent state and would take arms in their separationist movements. Exclusive sources report that a Turkish mission is due in Tehran to discuss the Kurdish situation with the Iranian officials in hope of forming a joint front to confront the Kurdish movement. However, members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party have announced that they have no link with the Turkish Kurds and that they are not fighting for separatism from Iran. Although Imam Khomeini has promised to give one day's oil income to the Kurdish development in order to persuade the Kurds to lay down their arms and cooperate with the Government, the Kurds who are members of the KDP have said that if the government plans to continue its war against the "Kurdish people," they would stage a full fledged war and that the government would be responsible for its consequences.

CSO: 4920

PLOT OF 'CRISIS COMMITTEE' EXPOSED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 23 Aug 79 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN -- "During the last dying days of the previous regime, a committee called the "Crisis Committee" was formed to develop military strategy against the people, "an ex-official of the deposed shah told the Islamic Revolutionary Court yesterday.

The committee, consisting of then Interior Minister Qarabaghi, Air Force Commander Rahi'oe, Gen. Badraie, Navy Commander Rahimi and an American advisor, met daily to plot against the people, disclosed Lieutenant General Nasser Frouzmand during his trial.

The Lt. General is one of three officials of the previous regime who are currently being tried at Evin Prison on charges of participating in massacres during the days of the revolution.

The other two are the Deputy Coordinator of the Staff of the Armed Forces and Sergeant Major in the now defunct Imperial Guards, Hossain Shaikh, and chief of the Tehran Police Station No. 9, Karim Bayirami.

The basic policy of the government in its last days, said Frouzmand, was not to let the Army unite with the people.

"This separation attempt was successful to a great extent and intensified greatly when the ex-shah left the country. During these days, we used to think that there was no longer any basis left for the imperial government to go on ruling the country. It was in these days that the Crisis Committee was founded. The whole country was burning in turmoil," Frouzmand said.

The trial began yesterday morning at the prison, which is situated at the northwestern edge of Tehran by the Central Islamic Revolutionary Court.

At the beginning, the customary verses from the holy Quran were read, including those on the basis of which the three accused were being tried. After that, their indictment was read. All three were accused of killing people during the days of the Revolution and consequently "fighting against the will of God and his prophets and spreading corruption on earth."

In his defense, the Lt. Gen. added, "Ex-interior Minister Qarabaghi - summoned me and First Deputy Gen. Hatem of the staff of the Imperial Guards to discuss the situation. I suggested that because the situation is out of hand, we'd better move toward the people rather than escape from them. I also suggested that we should immediately contact Imam Rouhollah Khomeini."

He went on to say that toward the end of Bahman (mid-February) a decision-making council was founded which consisted of the minister and top Army officials and at their meeting it was decided that the Army announce its neutrality and also prevent people from entering military garrisons. When the announcement was made on the radio, we intensified the protection of important garrisons, but when the people finally took over the main police station and the police college in Tehran we opened the doors of the garrisons to them.

POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY INTERVENTION AT HOME

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 1 Aug 79 p 6

[Article by 2nd Lt Mohsen Darvish, printed in "MOJAHED," Publication of Islamic Society of Qasr Garrison: "Will the Army Acquire the Legality of Intervention in Domestic Affairs Through the Corps of Guardians?"]

[Summary] The uprising of our oppressed people, who had tasted the domination of imperialism and its puppet regime for a long time, resulted in the downfall of the regime. During the incumbency of the black dictatorship of the "Aryamehr" regime the people had been deprived of their most preliminary human and political rights, and thus, they were not given the opportunity to have any intervention in resolving and shaping their destinies.

Creation of Revolution Committees:

At the peak of the revolution the masses of the people initiated the formation of certain fundamental organs, in order to enable them to remove the obstacles confronting them in the wake of revolution. Part of these organs were later transformed to units called Revolution Committees, which could bring into existence councils, elected by the people, and which would serve as the best means and guarantees for the preservation of political freedoms, and for the participation of the people while adopting political decisions. Unfortunately, their exclusive form of a military nature served as a cause to have them used for evil purposes by certain incompetent and even self-interested elements. As a result, not only these committees did not become popular organs, but they, in some cases, served to hinder the ordinary affairs of the people, and even created discontent and resentments.

The Corps of Revolution Guards:

Because of its opposition to and resistance against the people's movement, the army did not enjoy any popularity among the people, and it was expected all the time that it was going to stage a coup. On the other hand, the committees were not capable of exercising any control over the army because of their status of a regional nature, devoid of any capability of centralization. That is why the Corps of Revolution Guards was brought into existence

on an independent basis, with a hope that it would even be capable to assume the duties of the Police and Gendarmerie also in the future. This new organ was designed to act as the arms of the Islamic revolution, ready to prevent any attempt of conspiracy worked out against the revolution. Unfortunately, due to the presence of certain undesirable elements in the high-level leadership of this organization, it was, in a short period of time, converted into a retaliatory means for settling personal enmities, grudges and resentments, the very first example of which was reflected in the arrest of Ayatollah Taleqani's sons. And this was the start of its deviation. Slanders, accusations, baseless charges brought against various people were provided abundantly, and thus the masses lost their faith and confidence in a short period of time, and the Corps of Guards was abandoned by the people.

Participation of Corps of Guards in Regional Affairs:

The dictatorial regime had succeeded in concealing the overwhelming contrasts of the society, but following its downfall they were exposed vividly in the remote areas of the country. One of the issues which seems to be an indisputable fact, is that the question of the nationalities could never be solved by resorting to military force, because this would make it more complicated. The only way to solve it would be to find a political solution. That is why by the involvement of the Corps of Guards in national and regional problems not only those crises have not been eliminated, but, on the contrary, they have been intensified more and more. On the other hand, the weakness and training inefficiency of the Corps of Guards, and lack of adequate equipment have paved the way to legalize the intervention of the army, which had so far been prevented from getting involved in domestic skirmishes and confrontations.

Recent Evolution of the Army:

Prior to the revolution the people of Iran were dauntlessly being suppressed by the army, and this was considered to be one of its major duties. Nowadays not only the people will not tolerate such an aspect, but the military personnel themselves will refrain from being placed in such a position. In this connection, in statements released by them on various occasions, they have suggested that the army's non-intervention in domestic developments be guaranteed. In the meantime, since Ayatollah Taleqani has stated that the formation of councils would be the only means to examine the requirements of the oppressed people of Iran, there remains no pretext for the intervention of the army.

Now, we do witness every day the revival of the army at a great speed. The bills of amnesty endorsed recently prohibit any insults uttered against the army in the form of criticism, and the former commanders and mercenaries of the toppled regime are being released from prison. The counter-intelligence services are being revived with the same old cadres, and with the same duties and targets. The arms agreements have remained intact, and the advisers have

been invited to return, to continue their work. Recently, by the unexpected refusal of the request of the personnel of the Air Force, suggesting to form councils, it became more than obvious that the army has been sparing no efforts to revive its past power and authority.

Under these circumstances the people, as well as the revolutionary forces existing within the army, are following the course of the events with great anxiety. Of course, they will not surrender easily to this new trend. In the meantime, the dismissal of Amir-Rahimi, Commander of the Military Police, is another hint to this tendency, as well as the dismissal of other personnel who have been advocating the concept that the army should not be placed vis-a-vis the people, and that it should be converted to a democratic military organization. These aspects could be preliminary steps for the intervention of the army in regional affairs, aimed at suppressing the people as before.

Bells of Danger Have Begun to Toll:

One is not surprised, that immediately after the elimination of part of the contrasts existing inside the army, one reads the following news-item concerning the army:

"The security of the Urumiyeh area has been entrusted to the 64th Division by the government, and the Minister of Defense has announced, that the army should intervene for the protection of tumultuous regions."

By a simple comparison of the situation and the latest instructions issued recently, and during the time following the downfall of the dictatorial regime, one could observe a great change of a qualitative nature. These developments emanate from efforts focused on the revival of the army's reputation, and the legalization of its intervention even in the domestic affairs of the country.

By the entry of the army onto the political stage, one is tempted to bring up this question: Isn't this a warning to have our attention focused on the consequences of these developments, and keep us informed of the tragic events awaiting our people in the relatively near future? Doesn't this move pave the way for the army to act as it did in the past, i.e. to resort to every means, including the suppression of the people, on the pretext of preserving peace and order?

CSO: 4906

NEUTRALITY OF 'AYANDEGAN' DISCUSSED BY TUDEH ORGAN

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 15 Jul 79 p 6

[Article published in "MARDOM" newspaper, Central Organ of the Tudeh Party of Iran: "Is AYANDEGAN Newspaper 'impartial'?"]

[Summary] Anti-Tudeh and anti-communist policies, irrespective of their aims and targets, especially under circumstances prevailing in Iran today, when "unity of forces" is an essential necessity, are undoubtedly beneficial to the interests of anti-revolutionary elements.

We are of the opinion, that certain circles and organs of the mass media, who have adopted an anti-Tudeh attitude, including the Maoists and the rightist newspapers, are doing nothing but rendering service to imperialism. In the meantime, certain newspapers, presenting themselves as "independent" and "impartial," by their anti-Tudeh attitude do permit, knowingly and unknowingly, that the blood-thirsty imperialism exploit their policies in the best way possible.

In this connection the newspaper AYANDEGAN has adopted such an attitude that it could be labelled a "continuous policy." In carrying out this anti-Tudeh attitude, the newspaper refrains from reflecting the news concerning the Party and its martyrs, and also publishes slanderous articles against the Party, prepared by Maoists.

For instance, the news concerning the attack on the newsdealer of a certain group was carried on the first page of AYANDEGAN, whereas it never reflected a series of raids made in the provinces on the offices of the Tudeh Party of Iran. Or, it overlooked the protest appearing on the first page of MARDOM in connection with the attack organized against the rally of the National Democratic Front, whereas the protests of other groups were promptly inserted in AYANDEGAN. Again, the Tudeh Party of Iran was one of the first political organizations, which criticized the Bill of the Anti-revolution Tribunals, but AYANDEGAN, in its commentary of weekly events, noted that PEYGHAM-E EMBRUZ and AZADI were the only newspapers which discussed the issue.

On the other hand, while criticizing the censorship exercised by TV authorities in connection with the news-items and articles televised in its programs, AYANDEGAN follows in the footsteps of the TV when dealing with questions connected with the Tudeh Party. For example, the articles of Maoist elements appearing in their publications have very few readers, but the republication of those items in AYANDEGAN the latter helps to increase the circulation of their papers.

This policy was apparently adopted by AYANDEGAN from the time when the Tudeh Party criticized the hypocritical leftist attitudes of certain newspapers, including AYANDEGAN. The editorial staff of the newspaper being well aware of our approach to democratic freedoms, including the freedom of press, first they published a comment on our attitude released by Agence France Presse, and then several items from Maoist and Trotskyist publications, such as KARGAR, PEYKAR, ETTEHAD-E CHAP, and PEYKAR-E KHALQ. In order to observe the principle of impartiality wouldn't it be proper to publish one of the articles of our Party dealing with the press, and then leave the conclusion to the readers?

AYANDEGAN has also had a special approach to the martyrs of the Tudeh Party, who like other martyrs belong to the people of Iran. During the anniversary of Siahkal event two of our comrades, Turaj Heydari Bigvand and Rahim Sheykh-zadeh, were labelled as "opportunists." These two martyrs, along with a group, had split from the Cherkha-ye Feda'i-ye Khalq, and had joined the Tudeh Party. Then efforts were made by AYANDEGAN to separate the members of the Party from its leadership or the Party. For instance, Khosrov Ruzbeh, a member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, was referred to as "a devoted and struggling member of the Tudeh Party."

A series of other examples could also be cited, indicative of the evil intent and malice of AYANDEGAN newspaper, but it seems the few cases mentioned so far would suffice to have the readers of our newspaper, as well as those of AYANDEGAN, pass their judgment in connection with the newspaper's claim of "impartiality" and "independence."

CSO: 4906

WARNINGS ON THE EVENTS OF KORDESTAN

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 22 Jul 79 p 8

[Statement of Federative Republican Party of the Peoples of Iran]

[Summary] Kordestan is once again pregnant with a series of events, and this time a dirty and cunning plot has been hatched by reactionary elements. There exist evidences hinting that we would be facing more bloody events than we had in Sanandaj, Conbad, Naqadeh and Khorramshahr should the question be overlooked as an ordinary issue. According to evidence available, the next target of the reactionary forces is Mahabad. It seems the adventurous events of the rural districts of Jaldian have not satisfied the plotters. In this connection it should be mentioned, that the presence in Kordestan of a number of progressive forces, endeavoring for the security, and the political, cultural and economic sovereignty of the Kurdish people, has caused a great anxiety to reactionary circles. Unfortunately, during the bloody events of Naqadeh, and later in the skirmishes of the Jaldian rural districts the footprints of a man called Hasani, and those of his armed men, could easily be traced, who hiding themselves under the guise of the Army, raided those areas ruthlessly, killed and looted the inhabitants, and set their residences on fire. This time the plot is being hatched in Urumiyeh, and is to be carried out in Mahabad.

Unfortunately, there seems to be no doubt at all, that the Radio-TV network has had a subversive role in the creation and development of these conspiracies by its malicious reportings and fabrications, acting as an executor of those reactionary and anti-popular plots by distorted news items and completely baseless reports. This attitude of the "Voice" and "Image" of Iran has been adding fuel to the agitations and provocations existing in the Kurdish area, indicating in the meantime that the peoples of Iran will never have the opportunity of becoming aware of true and reliable information.

The most interesting point worthy of attention in the recent events of the Jaldian rural district, including the assault on the Police headquarters of Mahabad, is that the feudal landlords were the axis of the confrontation. These elements, following the victory of the revolution, have allowed themselves to go back to those areas and have the peasants kicked out of the lands already belonging to them, and when encountered by the natural reaction

and resistance of the peasants, the landlords have resorted to the protection of the "Provisional Leadership" (Barzani remnants). Then one shot fired in the air was enough to unleash a fight. Using this as a pretext, the so-called warriors of a man named Hasani, as if awaiting a sign, step immediately onto the stage, and thus they carry out the prearranged plan. It goes beyond saying, that as always, the feudal landlords' rights were recognized and protected, and the peasants were suppressed and punished. The assault organized against the rural districts of Jaldian, and the disarming of the Police personnel of Mahabad were two incidents created by reactionary elements, aimed at creating dissension, fratricide, and an atmosphere of fear and terror. During these developments the agents of the "Provisional Leadership" were pinpointed, and were later condemned to death and imprisonment by the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal of Mahabad. Those agents were enjoying the support of the authorities stationed in Urumiyeh.

It should be mentioned with utmost regret, that this time too, the Provisional Revolutionary Government has been assisting the success of the new plot by its silence. On the other hand, no efforts are being spared to have military units dispatched to Mahabad, and have once again the Army face the people for a confrontation. According to information available, 4 tank battalions and a number of troops have most probably been already dispatched to Mahabad from Kazvin and Zanzan respectively.

The Federative Republican Party of the Peoples of Iran is of the opinion, that these developments should be taken into serious consideration. Also, the Party considers it to be most apropos to warn the Provisional Government, Army authorities, as well as the Revolutionary Council, and to keep them aware of the vast extension of the forthcoming plot. The tragedy would be so great this time, that it cannot be compensated by any means. It is up to the government to prevent the occurrence of such an unexpected and dreadful event. We do believe sincerely, that dispatch of military units to Mahabad for the suppression of the progressive forces, would be a step taken against the Kurdish people. Such measures of exercising power and restoring authority not only would not be helpful for solving problems and eliminating difficulties, but would give birth to new complications. At a time when the wounds inflicted on Gonbad, Sanandaj, Naqadeh and Khorramshahr have not yet healed, let us not bring into existence new problems, and let us not allow the occurrence of a horrible tragedy by a new bloodshed in Kordestan. Let us nip the conspiracy in the bud. The Provisional Government is charged with the duty of preventing the massacre of the Kurdish people. It should act decisively, for it will directly be held responsible for any event of that nature.

The Federative Republican Party of the Peoples of Iran, based on its mission of defending the legitimate rights of the peoples of Iran, draws the attention of all the progressive parties and groups to the plots to be carried out in Mahabad in the near future. Their silence would encourage the plotters to carry out their plans. Let them be aware of this fact.

PTT MINISTER CRACKS DOWN ON ILLEGAL WIRETAPPING

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 Aug 79 p 3

[Text]

TEHRAN - Minister for Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) Hassan Eslami announced yesterday that two of the persons who were illegally tapping telephone calls were arrested.

PTT minister disclosed that those arrested for tapping the telephone calls in the capital were anti-revolutionary elements and "they were arrested and handed over to the Islamic Revolutionary Court."

Eslami announced that for the past few weeks his ministry suspected that telephone calls were being monitored in Tehran. "We suspected for sometime that the telephone conversations were being tapped by some of the anti-revolutionaries, and after thorough investigations we have been able to arrest two of the agents responsible for monitoring telephone conversations."

Speaking about the installation of electronic devices and a computerized telephone system in the country, the minister said, "We have decided to install electronic telephone devices in the country with the cooperation of the Shiraz Electronic Industry and the

Research Center. More than 1,000 telephone connections are already passing through production stages."

Eslami announced that the workers of the Shiraz Electronic Industry will be employed by the PTT ministry. "After the country's telephone system is changed to an electronic one, we will employ Shiraz Electronic Industry workers. We will do this to avoid the import of foreign experts and manpower, but if we are still short of technicians, then we will have to invite foreign experts," Eslami revealed.

Speaking about the country's present telephone system and the advantages of the computerized telephone system, the PTT minister stated, "The country's present telephone system is electro-mechanical which is comparatively slower than the computerized telephone system."

Speaking about the recent changes in the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Ministry, Eslami said, "We have dissolved various positions of director general's and have transferred them to various departments where we have a shortage of manpower."

CSO: 4920

JUDICIARY TO BE RESTRUCTURED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 28 Aug 79 p 5

[Article by Ali Afsharpour]

[Text] In order to maintain equity and justice throughout the country both in towns and in the rural areas the Minister of Justice presented a new scheme for the reorganization of the Justice Ministry of Imam Khomeini. The new courts under the scheme are expected to perform more efficiently taking up legal suits to their final stage in the shortest possible time.

The new scheme is expected to change fundamentally and bring in unprecedented reforms into the existing courts and other judicial institutions connected to them. Affiliated and associated organizations such as the organization for identity registrations and the Notary Public offices are likely to be affected.

Plans of the new scheme along with a report dealing with it were handed over to Imam Khomeini during a visit of Cabinet Ministers headed by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan to the Revolutionary Leader. A number of other government dignitaries and prominent figures were at that meeting.

Prime Minister Bazargan was accompanied by the new Minister of Justice Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyed Javadi and Deputy Prime Minister Bani Asadi who took part in prolonged discussions and formal talks on government's current activities and future courses of action to be determined. In this they sought the advice and direction of the reverend leader Imam Khomeini. The problem solving sessions led to several important decisions being made.

One of the main and vital topics discussed was the formation of new courts to replace and substitute the numerous courts now existing at different levels. The minister of justice also presented a detailed report connected with the General Amnesty Bill as to what it entails, its text and the extended implications of the Bill.

Yet another plan discussed was that for the formation of courts to be called anti-revolutionary courts. The points considered were their staffing and procedure and how they would be constituted to hear cases filed against persons considered anti-revolutionary agents, those accused of anti-state and criminal activities and others in a similar category.

The new plans for the judiciary are expected to usher in very important and

imminent reforms in the judicial machinery to ensure that justice and equity will be within the reach of every Iranian national irrespective of whether he lived in a big town or in the farthestmost villages of this vast country.

Imam Khomeini addressing the minister of justice on the need for implementing the various bills and schemes for reorganization of the courts said that they should in every aspect be enlightened and pay due regard to Islamic laws and principles and should be unmistakably "Islamic Courts."

"Speed up the functioning of the courts, satisfy the requirements of those applying to the courts for redress of the grievances and make them feel happy that they have been justly heard and just decisions made in your courts," said Imam Khomeini

to the judicial officials present.

The Imam expressed a great deal of concern at the delays in justice that were prevalent in the earlier legal system. A string of cases were pending and litigants had to go through a number of needless formalities. He exhorted the minister and judicial officers present to make quick decisions to speed up the affairs of the ministry of justice and dispose of cases with a view to ensuring justice and equity to the satisfaction of litigants.

Ahmad Sadr Haj Seyed Javadi has presented other bills and new plans for restructuring the ministry of justice in keeping with its new revolutionary functions and these are all being studied by the Revolutionary Council and the Junta and will after due consideration be channelled through to the Cabinet for legislation and implementation.

A problem now confronting the ministry of justice is on how to eradicate anti-revolutionary agents and their activities. The new courts for this purpose will have to work alongside the system of justice prevalent at present, the present judge's cooperation has to be sought in this and also that of the religious judges.

An important bill among those submitted was one that stipulated the qualifications for the new religious judges in the common law courts to be established. It defines procedure for them in keeping with already established principles and precedents set by judges earlier and which were in conformity with Islamic judicial principles and practices.

In framing the provisions for setting up the new common law courts one of the most useful purposes served would be elimination of delays in meeting out

justice. There will be no more need for public procedure offices and the Shahrestan and Ostan courts, (the latter is an appeal court). Appeals will now be reduced to a minimum unless found absolutely necessary and hearings will not go into several days, weeks and months as before. Courts which were established for considering cases of government officials, the special droit administratif courts on the French model, will be abolished.

The primary aim behind the setting up of the new courts will be to have a "one stage court" as it were to effect a saving in time, energy and bureaucratic form filling and affixing of stamps which were all symptoms of a sick system of justice.

Judicial systems in most parts of the world and the one that existed in Iran all these years invariably ended in making lawyers richer and pauperising litigants who came for justice even further. The very purpose of their existence was defeated when poor litigants who came to courts with genuine grievances were even put into more trouble and expense. The new common law courts would simplify procedure and yet be a more effective and equitable instrument for dispensing justice.

There can be very little doubt that the new courts will make for greater efficiency and a streamlining of justice to the good of the poorer litigant but one must exercise a deal of caution. It has been observed by legal experts and it will occur to the lay mind too that justice requires a careful scrutiny of evidence to discern truth from falsehood. To simplify court procedure is one thing but it is on the other hand absolutely necessary to make certain that there will be no miscarriage of justice.

A summary court, as the new courts will mostly be,

may in their haste to dispose of cases fail to go thoroughly into evidence or judge incorrectly. In such cases especially where a person's life is at stake, say in a murder case, there should be recourse to appeal and a more thorough investigation of the case in question. In no case should a person who comes for judgement before a court be left with a feeling that he has been wronged.

It will be the duty of the ministry of justice therefore to incorporate certain safeguards into the laws to be promulgated. In the more serious cases such as murder cases, or those involving the whole livelihood and future of persons, provision should be made for examination by a properly constituted jury who will be advised and directed by persons conversant with the laws of the country and who will deliberate and judge accordingly.

It would indeed be well for the Revolutionary Council and the Junta who are to consider the new courts system to be aware of the defects that the new system might be prone to and provide for changes. It may perhaps be a good idea for a provision to be included in the new bill that it will be subject to ultimate approval by a new national assembly which will be elected after the constitution has been promulgated. It will leave the way open for useful and necessary changes to be made.

In the meantime the new courts and laws can be implemented and put into operation on a provisional basis. No doubt the lessons and experiences gathered from its actual workings will prove to be a valuable guide in working out and initiating more permanent changes in the law and in the judicial machinery of the country as a whole.

IRAN

ARAB PEOPLE'S CULTURAL CENTER ISSUES STATEMENT

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 22 Jul 79 p 3

[Text] Following the recent incidents in Khorramshahr, the Arab People's Cultural Center of Iran in Tehran published a statement in which it condemned the armed attack on the demonstrations held by the Arab people of Abadan and the bloody incident at Khorramshahr's Great Mosque, and it pointed out, "The thing that has instilled horror in the heart of all freedom-loving people is the manner in which the trials of Arab youths were conducted during the past few days" and the fact that "Whatever offenses these young people committed, they do not justify the courts' trial procedures and haste." It expressed anxiety that, if such trials are not challenged by the freedom-loving people of Iran, "they might become common practice and the actions of such courts might become the norm."

In continuation, the statement said, "Such secret and hasty trials where the court officials do not even give the accused an opportunity to defend themselves and brazenly announce the trial concurrent with, or following, their execution have raised doubts." The Arab People's Cultural Center stressed, "We will ask the Lawyer's Center, the Lawyer's Society, and the Society for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights to take steps to clarify the facts pertaining to the above trials."

8514

CNO: 4806

ACTIVITIES OF COMMITTEE IN U.S. EMBASSY DISCUSSED

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 22 Jul 79 p 6

- [Text] It is the responsibility of those who complain about orders from various decision making centers to state who is responsible for the activities of the committee in the American Embassy. It has become clear from the inquiries we have made that, first of all, this committee is not one of the 14 Committees and Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani is not responsible for the activities of this committee. He said, "The committee in the American Embassy is not one of the 14 Committees, and the activities of this committee are not my responsibility."

Thirdly [sic], since 2/2/58 [22 April 1979], when the Revolutionary Guards Corps was organized with new regulations under a command Council supervised by the Islamic Revolutionary Council, the committee in the American Embassy has not been under the supervision of this Corps.

The person responsible for this committee, Morteza Kashani, known as Haj Masha'allah, said that he is under the supervision of the Corps; but, the Operations Commander of the Guards Corps said, "This committee has not been under my supervision so far; nor is it right now." He added, "I have not issued any order for the operations of this committee since 22 April 1979, when the Corps was formed with new regulations and I assumed command of its operations."

The question is: "Is this committee autonomous"? "Is it being supervised by certain individuals outside of the centers that properly should be supervising it"?

Moreover, we have a few questions to pose to Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani and the Revolutionary Guards Corps: "If this committee is not operating under their supervision, why do they not take steps to disband it"? If we are in agreement that, for 25 years, America has systematically undertaken a program to exterminate Iran, and still has not stopped, how is it possible not to enlighten the people, and to permit a committee to operate in the Embassy building of such a country without the permission of the officials of the appropriate organizations"?

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CSO: 4806

IRAN

GENDARME DISCUSSES GULF CREATED BETWEEN PEOPLE, ARMY

Tehran AYENDEGAN in Persian 13 Jul 79 p 11

[Letter by Nasser Mohammad Hosseyni, Gendarmerie CWO]

[Text] I read in the AYENDEGAN newspaper of Sunday, 10 Tir [1 July 1979], the article by Mr Rasul Mehraban, member of the Iran Party, and I have also read several other articles by him in the newspaper, AYENDEGAN. Mr. Mehraban seems to be a politician, who dabbles in writing and, every so often writes articles analyzing the politics of the country. Perhaps, he even thinks that he has extensive and comprehensive knowledge of political affairs. In his recent article, he severely attacked and criticized the Chief of Staff of the Islamic Republic's Army. He asked, "Why did the Commander of the Ground Forces write to Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani stating that he should refrain from printing and distributing posters depicting the mass murder in Tehran's Square of the Martyrs"? Although, during my 28 years service, my instructors did not teach me anything about politics; nevertheless, I know that, in the countries where the people, like the people of Iran, have rebelled against their corrupt government and ruling class and where the people now have control of the government, have changed their situation 180 degrees from the standpoint of the economy, culture, health, etc., have freed themselves from the yoke of Imperialism, and have brought their nation to the threshold of advanced civilization, following the rebellion, they have engaged in constructing the country, in the true sense; whereas, most of the politicians and dignitaries only read about politics and construction in textbooks entitled, "Politics" and "Construction" and do not know very much about real construction, nor do they want to begin construction in its true sense. Instead of expressing appreciation to the Chief of Staff of the Army, who, like a skillful and sympathetic surgeon, is busy night and day building the Armed Forces and boosting the lost morale of the personnel of the country's Armed Forces, for speaking so constructively, you and a few other individuals, by writing articles in the large circulation newspapers that remain, further disrupt the morale of the people and show that you have not grasped the meaning of construction.

By writing articles such as these, you are creating a gulf between the people and the Army as in the past, and you are spreading the seed of discord and pessimism among the people and the personnel of the Islamic Republic's Armed Forces. If you look at the Vietnam War, which is considered one of the most notorious involvements of the last century, you will note that, following

the people's victory over their corrupt regime, the masses of the people, after banishing the traitorous generals from the Army and sending them to farming communes, treated the rest of their soldier brothers with kindness. This same Army, after rebuilding itself, was able to demonstrate its self-improvement in a very short time and to regain its lost morale. It confronted a powerful, well-equipped army such as the Communist Chinese Army and stood up to it.

Come to your senses. You, and the likes of you, who imagine yourselves to be politicians and revolutionaries, should narrow the gulf between the Army personnel and the people until the Army personnel have merged with them and fulfill, in the true sense, your responsibility toward the country, which is this same construction. You should not pour salt on the wounds of the afflicted people of Iran, instead of balm, and you should not widen the gulf between the Army and the people.

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CSO: 4806

ACTIVITIES OF POLITICAL GROUPS

Tehran AYANDEGAN in Persian 17 Jul 79 p 3

[Text] The Council of Publishers and Booksellers and the National Democratic Front protested the arrest of Nasim Khaksar:

Council of Publishers and Booksellers

The Council of Publishers and Booksellers protested the arrest of Nasim Khaksar, who was put in jail in Abadan the day before yesterday and, in a statement entitled, "Writer and Popular Militant in the Vise of the Oppressors," it warned yesterday: "Everyone recognized the past anti-popular regime and everyone fought it with all their might. This time, however, forces of oppression are forming and their faces are hidden from the majority of the simple and loyal people of our country."

In this statement, the Council of Publishers and Booksellers expressed the hope that the militant people of Iran, through exposure and by their own effort, can publicly disgrace these criminals with new faces and that patriots in the South, too, can mobilize themselves to secure the release of this prominent, militant writer.

National Democratic Front

Yesterday, the National Democratic Front praised Khaksar in a statement and called him "an informed, committed, and militant writer who spent many years of his life in the dungeons of the hated Pahlavi regime."

The National Democratic Front protested Nasim Khaksar's arrest, which "apparently" was carried out without any evidence by agents who did not present any credentials, and it demanded "a clarification of the matter and the immediate release of Khaksar."

West Kurdistan Farm Union

Yesterday, 62 representatives of the Farm Union from the villages in the West Kurdistan area, Piranshahr, and Jeldian met with Dr Sahabi, Deputy Prime Minister, to discuss problems and issues in this area.

Following this meeting, Qadr Khaledi, the representative from the village of Jeldian, said, "We were supposed to meet with the Prime Minister today (yesterday) after meeting with Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Shari'atmadari; but, at 1400 hours, they informed us that the Prime Minister could not come to the meeting place because he was indisposed, and his deputy, Dr Sahabi, met with us."

Khaledi added, "In this meeting, the representatives protested regarding the arming of the feudals by the Orumiyeh (Rezaiyeh) Committee and the spiteful radio propaganda regarding the Kurdish people."

According to Khaledi, Dr Sahabi asked the representatives of the farmers to give the government time, and he promised that, by Thursday, a committee would be sent to the area by the government to investigate.

8514

CSO: 4806

AIR FORCE STILL UNCOOPERATIVE WITH PCOI

Tehran EXCLUSIVE in English 26 Aug 79 p 3

[Text] It is no longer a secret that the personnel of the National Iranian Air Force is most reluctant to cooperate with the Islamic Government of Iran. Although the Air Force technicians--Homafars--were the first army groups to join the people during the revolution, but 17,000 of the total 18,000 Homafars have now changed their minds about the new rule in Iran and despite the fact that they are not on strike, they are most reluctant to do their work properly. On the other hand, the pilots, too, are making various excuses in order to remain impartial in the Government's war against the Kurds in Iran.

The air force has already had five commanders. It was only three weeks ago when General Imanian was replaced by another commander who was in office only for one week to be replaced again last week by General Bagheri. But it seems that the unity between the young pilots and officers of the air force is making the job most difficult for any commander to reorganize the air force to obey the orders issued by Imam Khomeini.

Exclusive sources believe that a number of pilots and young officers who were in the United States during the revolution and did not return home, are now having contacts with their colleagues in Tehran persuading them to form a joint front against the regime in Iran.

Exclusive sources believe that few aircrafts and helicopters are still in the position of young Air Force officers in certain neighbouring countries and could be used against the Islamic Government if the pressure put on the Air Force gets unbearable for them.

According to exclusive sources, a number of Air Force officers are presently negotiating with the unhappy army officers to persuade them to cooperate. These army officers have reportedly tanks and other heavy combat equipment at their disposals.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

TABRIZ MAYOR RESIGNS—According to the AYENDEGAN correspondent in Tabriz, the Mayor of Tabriz has resigned from office and his resignation has been accepted by Engineer Gharavi, Governor of East Azarbaijan. In an interview with AYENDEGAN, the resigned mayor said that the reason he resigned was the lack of powers and funds. He added that, in the past, Tabriz experienced numerous deprivations and now it is necessary to compensate for them; but, because of the lack of funds, he could not take the necessary steps for reconstruction. Following the mayor's resignation, the Governor of East Azarbaijan was present in the mayor's office yesterday afternoon and he introduced Engineer Shahidi as the new Mayor of Tabriz. [Text] [Tehran AYENDEGAN in Persian 18 Jul 79 p 4] 8514

NEW PUBLICATION--The first issue of NAMEH-E NUR, the Niavaran Culture House's publication of culture, the arts and literature, has been published. Hereafter, NAMEH-E NUR will be published monthly by the Niavaran Culture House. NAMEH-E NUR is a publication exclusively devoted to culture and the arts and the managers of this publication are focusing their efforts mostly on raising the level of society's knowledge of and insight into various fields of culture and the arts. [Text] [Tehran AYENDEGAN in Persian 18 Jul 79 p 3] 8514

REPORT DENIED—Bushehr—In an interview with the Pars News Agency yesterday morning, a spokesman for the Revolutionary Guards Corps of the Province of Bushehr firmly denied Iran's Voice of the Islamic Republic's report concerning the discovery of 100 Kalashnikov rifles, which was broadcast on the 9 pm news last night. He confirmed the report published by the Pars News Agency yesterday in this regard, and he added that the guards sent to the Delavar area the night before last succeeded in discovering one Colt 7.65 and approximately 8,000 cartridges and in arresting 24 people who had attempted to leave the country illegally. [Text] [Tehran AYENDEGAN in Persian 18 Jul 79 p 3] 8514

NEW AMBASSADOR—According to Foreign Ministry sources, Dr Ebrahim Yaddi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, appointed and presented Hassan Ruhani as ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Damascus. [Text] [Tehran AYENDEGAN in Persian 18 Jul 79 p 3] 8514

ATOMIC ENERGY TRAINEES—Iran's Atomic Energy Organization has invited its trainees, who had already left for their cities, to return to Tehran to participate in the ceremonies assigning their places of work. [Text]
[Tehran AYENDEGAN in Persian 18 Jul 79 p3] 8514

ASSYRIANS VISITED--The Deputy Prime Minister visited the leader of Iran's Assyrians. Dr Tabatabai said regarding this meeting that the head of political affairs and public relations met with H.E. Patrick, the leader of the Assyrians of Iran, in his Office. Dr Tabatabai said regarding this meeting that the leader of the Assyrians expressed appreciation to the government of the Islamic Republic on behalf of the Assyrians of Iran and he added that he had announced to Assyrians throughout the world that the Assyrian minority of Iran enjoyed the desired freedom and tranquillity under the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. [Text] [Tehran AYENDEGAN in Persian 18 Jul 79 p3]
8514

CSO: 4806

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN UNIFICATION TALKS BETWEEN SYRIA, IRAQ

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 10 Aug 79 pp 17-19

[Article: "Sequence of Unification Talks Between Syria and Iraq; Recent Conspiracy Was an Operation To Destroy the Party from Its Base after Attempts To Destroy It from the Top Failed; Hafiz al-Asad Proposed that Saddam Husayn Take Corrective Action Similar to His Own in Syria"]

[Text] When Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad returned to Damascus after completing his recent visit to Baghdad--it was during this visit that the massacre at the Military College in Aleppo took place--he gathered the staff officers of the National Front in Syria to tell them about the recent developments in the Syrian-Iraqi unification meeting. According to what was attributed to Dr Jamal al-Atasi, the secretary general of the Nasirist Arab Socialist Union, al-Asad said that it was the difficulty of the Ba'th Party Command that was still obstructing the consummation of the record.

During the aforementioned meeting the Syrian president related his view of this difficulty by saying that the ruling party in Syria could not adopt the theory of "the founding leader" which the Iraqis were adopting with regard to Mr Michel 'Aflaq the secretary general of the party. This is because Michel 'Aflaq was one of the founders of the party. Al-Asad said that it was his opinion that the founders of the party were all those who had participated in the First Constituent Congress in April 1947. Jalal al-Sayyid, Salah al-Din al-Baytar and Dr Wahib al-Ghanim, who is now living in Jabal al-'Alawiyyin where he practices medicine, were among those founders. In addition, there was Zaki al-Arsuzi. Although he did not attend the Constituent Congress, "al-Arsuzi was one of the first ones to expound the principles of al-Ba'th upon emigrating from the district of al-Iskandarun when the French handed it over to the Turks in the late thirties."

Those who attended the meeting of the National Front in Damascus are saying that President al-Asad had informed them that he had made those statements to the Iraqis in the course of his discussions with them about the party matter on which no agreement has been reached.

Syrians who read the Iraqi communique after President al-Asad's return to Damascus sensed from sentences occurring therein that the meeting had been "disappointing." But they also sensed that continued accord [between Syria and Iraq] was still possible until they heard what al-Asad had said at the meeting of the National Front. They then became convinced that matters had gone back to square one, that a struggle between the two parties was looming on the horizon and that this struggle would not end unless one of them were to establish his authority by removing the other party. Recent events in Iraq confirm this tendency.

It was said that al-Asad had also stated that when he issued a presidential decree to stay the execution of Michel 'Aflaq and a decree to pardon Salah al-Din al-Baytar, he had intended to facilitate the possibility of an accord with the Iraqis regarding solving the party problem on "a basis of equality." During the previous deliberations, however, he had felt that "the Iraqis wanted exclusive power over the party and control over Syria." This explains the compelling reasons behind the law that was issued by the Syrian president, inflicting the most severe penalties on members of the ruling party in Syria who "double-cross" [the party] by joining other organizations. Parties of the National Front in Syria explained this measure in terms of a precautionary operation "lest the Iraqis infiltrate the ranks of the ruling party in Damascus." This operation was not directed against the other parties of the front as was the case in Iraq with regard to the communists.

Although it became evident after the recent events in Iraq that this was the heart of the problem, al-Asad used to discuss another dimension of the problem with some of his visitors when the dispute with Iraq was flaring up a year and a half ago. At that time those visitors had tried to persuade al-Asad that it was necessary to come to an understanding with Iraq to confront the situation that resulted from Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Israel in the fall of 1977. The Syrian president had told those [visitors], "Iraq has been suffering from a chronic sectarian problem, whereas we in Syria have overcome this problem a long time ago."

Those who heard these words directly spoken by the Syrian president were surprised that he should think thus. One of them told AL-HAWADITH, "When I heard this statement from President al-Asad, I foresaw one of two possibilities only: the president is either ignorant of what is happening in Syria or he is playing a dangerous game in Iraq: either one of these two possibilities would be a disaster."

Among what Arab diplomatic sources are relating in this regard is that the Syrian Embassy in Baghdad is the only one among all the Syrian embassies abroad that has a mandate for unlimited financial expenditures. Investigations that took place in Baghdad in the aftermath of the recent conspiracy have demonstrated that the defendants [in the case] had received sums of money from the Syrian military attache and that these sums of money had exceeded 1 million dinars. [The investigations also proved] that the

family of 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-Samira'i, who had led the previous conspiracy in 1973, was receiving a constant allowance from Syria. The families of those who had participated in that conspiracy were also receiving an allowance.

There are, of course, those who did not believe the Iraqi story about the participation of the Syrians in the recent conspiracy that was led by five members of the Revolutionary Command Council. Those people are inclined to believe that it was an internal party attempt similar to that which had happened 6 years ago against what was described by Nazim Kazar, who had carried out the unsuccessful attempt in 1973, as "the exclusive power of a certain group in government." But the fact that the Syrians are being accused [of complicity in this conspiracy] does in itself have effects and repercussions that go beyond the party context. An Arab ambassador in London described this situation when he became certain that the foreign agency that was being accused of the recent conspiracy was Syria. He said, "If Syria is being charged when it is innocent, such a charge would be disastrous; if Syria did in fact participate in the conspiracy, this would be a bigger disaster."

Iraqi Ba'thists are saying that the recent Syrian sponsored attempt was an attempt to destroy the Ba'th Party in Iraq "from the base" after the Syrians had failed to destroy it "from the top." What were the previous attempts to destroy the Iraqi Ba'th Party "from the top?"

Those who have been following the phases of conflict and accord between the Syrian regime and the Iraqi regime ever since Hafiz al-Asad came to power in Syria in 1970 state that each one of them tried at the outset to impose his experience on the other. The Iraqis did so in the name of "party legitimacy" represented by the historical national command of the party which "the regionalists" in Syria had overthrown under the leadership of Salah Jadid and with the consent of Hafiz al-Asad on 23 February 1966. The Syrians [tried to impose their experience on the Iraqis] in the name of the "corrective action" to which Hafiz al-Asad had attributed "equality."

Although some Ba'thists outside Syria were expecting Hafiz al-Asad to restore matters to their former state after his coup against Salah Jadid in 1970, the Syrian president stood by the moving forces of the previous movement. Those were represented by Salah Jadid, Nur al-Din al-Atasi, Yusif Za'ni and Ibrahim Makhus. They had taken over the government from Lt Gen Amin al-Hafiz and Salah al-Din al-Baytar during the military coup that had been led by Salim Hatum, by Maj Gen 'Izzat Jadid and by 'Abd-al-Karim al-Jindi. Hatum was executed by firing squad; he had escaped to Jordan following an unsuccessful attempt, but was then lured back to Syria where he was executed in 1969. According to those who saw him before his death and days before Hafiz al-Asad took over the government 'Abd-al-Karim al-Jindi shot himself when he found out that he had been the victim of a deliberate sectarian collusion. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Jindi had smuggled his will to one of the Beirut newspapers; it contained serious charges against President al-Asad.

Although his coup against Salah Jadid did not turn back to the former position with regard to recognition of the national command--most of whose members reside in Iraq with the exception of Salah al-Din al-Baytar who announced his resignation from the party and stayed in Beirut--al-Asad continued to insist that his action was "a critical revision of the corrective action." It was the Iraqi Ba'thists who initiated the contact from the beginning of his administration. The Iraqis sent their minister of foreign affairs, who at that time was 'Abd-al-Karim al-Shaykhili, to talk to al-Asad about establishing a confederation between the two countries on the basis of solving the party problem. But al-Shaykhili was not successful in persuading al-Asad to accept the Iraqi point of view on "the unity of the party" as opposed to "the unity between the two parties." 'Abd-al-Karim al-Shaykhili was afterwards relieved of his duties in the party and in the government, and he was appointed representative of Iraq at the United Nations in New York. He remained in that position until early last year when he was summoned to Baghdad and arrested.

The Iraqis tried again by sending the new minister of foreign affairs Murtadi Sa'id 'Abd-al-Baqi al-Hadithi, who had replaced al-Shaykhili in that position and then resigned from it for health reasons and was appointed ambassador to Moscow. Murtadi 'Abd-al-Baqi came into the spotlight following the successful negotiations that he had conducted secretly with 'Ali Khala'tabari, the minister of foreign affairs of the Shah of Iran regarding the two problems of Shatt al-'Arab and the Kurds. [They had met] first in Geneva and then in Istanbul before the Shah and Saddam Husayn met in Algeria in 1974. It appeared at that time that the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs had reached some understanding with the Syrian president, especially since his talks in Damascus had been followed by a surprise visit that Saddam Husayn made to the Syrian capital to meet with President al-Asad and to put the final touches on the agreement. But Saddam Husayn's visit produced no result, and the dialogue was discontinued.

Syrian sources that were close to these negotiations are saying that President Hafiz al-Asad proposed that Saddam Husayn carry out "a corrective action" in Iraq similar to his own so that conditions in Syria and in Iraq would be equal. It was natural for Saddam Husayn to reject such a proposal because it would have led to the abolition of the party and not to its unity. In addition, it would have thrust Iraq into a whirlpool of coups similar to those that Syria has been experiencing ever since the coup against the national command.

All this happened before October 1973. It was because of this war, because of the participation of Iraqi forces in it and because the Syrian president himself made a surprise visit to Baghdad to discuss military and defense affairs that the Iraqi-Syrian dialogue which had been discontinued before the war was resumed.

When the dialogue was resumed, al-Asad re-submitted this proposal that there be "corrective action" in Iraq. This time, however, he made the proposal

to President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. When the Syrian president was in Baghdad, the Iraqis offered a new proposal on party unity that was quite flexible. They proposed that there be agreement on forming a liaison committee that would undertake convening an emergency national congress to investigate all party affairs and squabbles. This congress would settle and arbitrate matters, and it would choose a new national command to unify the two countries. To calm the fears of the Syrians lest the Iraqis attempt to foil their candidates in the party elections to the proposed congress, the Iraqis said that they had no reservations against any person in the Syrian party--from Mustafa Talas to Rif'at al-Asad and to the minor party members. [In return], the Syrians were to drop all reservations against Iraqi party members or Syrians residing in Iraq. As far as those who arouse the apprehensions of President al-Asad are concerned--and especially Lt Gen Amin al-Hafiz and some former military men--based on the fact that they may contemplate a vengeful coup if they return to Syria and their legitimacy is recognized, the Iraqis proposed that they be charitably removed and that they be made to accept residence abroad.

Al-Asad received this proposal and said that he wanted to take it to Damascus and study it before giving his final answer.

After a period of time during which feelings of optimism were high in the ranks of the Iraqi Ba'thists because they believed that the assurances which had been given to Hafiz al-Asad were sufficient to persuade him to enter into the project, the Syrian president sent his response to the Iraqi proposals in the form of a personal letter to President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. The letter delivered was by 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam.

Those who followed this phase of the negotiations say that the Syrian president offered the Iraqi president "a revised, corrective proposal" that did not differ in essence from his former proposal. Al-Asad suggested to al-Bakr that each one of them, that is, the Syrian and the Iraqi presidents, remove his national and regional command simultaneously and that they then agree together on a new unified organization. It is said that when al-Bakr read the letter he became furious and said, "He wants me to have a new 23 February in Iraq and to play the role of Salah Jadid until another Hafiz al-Asad should come along and overthrow me and so on! We will not do this in Iraq."

Al-Bakr presented al-Asad's letter to a special meeting of the national and regional commands with a reading and an explanation. He was authorized by those assembled to respond in a flexible manner, turning down the Syrian proposal, but offering at the same time new proposals for the purpose of maintaining the dialogue. Al-Bakr wrote to al-Asad and told him that he had presented the matter to the national and the regional commands and that, as a result, a decision to submit new proposals was made.

Al-Bakr's letter was sent to Damascus, but no answer came. Several months passed during which the crisis of the waters of the Euphrated occurred and

the Syrians prohibited Iraqi airplanes from flying in Syrian skies. The Iraqis responded by turning off the oil that flows through the pipeline from Kirkuk in North Iraq to Banyas and Tripoli on the Mediterranean Sea. They diverted the oil to the strategic pipeline which runs from Kirkuk to the Arabian Gulf and to the Mediterranean Sea via the Turkish line. It so happened that the Iraqi minister of irrigation went to Damascus to look into the crisis of the water of the Euphrates. When he went to make his farewells and pay his respects to the president, President al-Bakr requested that he ask the Syrian president about the reply to the letter he had sent him. The minister did so during this first meeting with President al-Asad. The Syrian president laughed a meaningful laugh and told the Iraqi minister, "I sent my letter to my brother, President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, and I did not send it to the national and regional command." Al-Asad had nothing else to say besides this verbal response until a new meeting took place. That meeting produced the Joint National Action Pact which was issued before the Ninth Arab Summit Conference was convened in Baghdad last October. It was thus understood that al-Asad wanted to make a high level deal behind the party's back, and this did not happen.

But after the proclamation of the Joint National Action Pact "underhanded operations" began taking shape. When the promised unity failed to materialize for a long period of time, minor figures in the Ba'th Party who believe in unity were asking about the reasons for the delay in proclaiming the unity and they were being told that everything was progressing as usual and that "there were some matters that were being settled so that the unity would not be a half-cooked scheme and subject to a break up." But the wave of questions surged as time went by and there were no results, and especially after the visit of Saddam Husayn to Damascus and his declaration in one of his speeches that "unity without party unity is a hoax."

Observers abroad were noticing that the joint celebrations and activities that were carried out in students' spheres by Syrian and Iraqi Ba'thists harbored an essential difference. On the anniversary of the establishment of the party last April, Iraqis and Syrians observed this occasion separately in London. The audience and the speakers in each one of them were different. In both celebrations only once was there mention of Mr Michel 'Aflaq, the secretary general of the party. It was surprising that during the Syrian celebration the name of Mr 'Aflaq be mentioned by the Sudanese journalist Husayn Mansur 'Uthman, the representative of the National Unionist Party.

During the celebration of the silver anniversary of the Arab Students' Union in the United Kingdom and Ireland--the celebration was attended by the former presidents of the union and by Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i who was representing the national command of the party--"a conflict in attributes" occurred between Dr al-Rafi'i and the Syrian Ambassador 'Adnan 'Umran. 'Umran had received instructions from Damascus to speak on behalf of "the secretary general of the Ba'th Party President Hafiz al-Asad." When the

Iraqi Ba'thists found out about this, they came close to having a fight [with the Syrians] until the matter was settled by having 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i and 'Adnan 'Umrani make their speeches on behalf of the national command of the Ba'th Party without any specifics.

According to Iraqi sources the participation of the Syrians in the recent attempt [to overthrow the government] in Iraq has shocked the minor figures in the Ba'th Party who had been hoping for unity, especially since they were enthusiastic about it. However, the shock that Saddam Husayn felt during the first days of his term as president was more painful and more distressing because five of his colleagues in the party command "had conspired against the party and the revolution" while holding the highest positions and being his closest protégés.

During the emergency meeting which Saddam Husayn had called for party leaders and senior cadres at the al-Khuld Hall, the new Iraqi president expressed his shock [at what had happened]. He shed many tears as he spoke to his friend, Ghanim 'Abd-al-Jalil who had participated in the conspiracy. "Why, Ghanim? Did we disagree about anything? Did you propose something upon which we did not agree? Did you ask for something with which we did not comply? What did you want? Saddam Husayn, the president of the Iraqi Republic wept bitter tears as he asked those questions so that everyone could hear. Those who were present shed many tears at that affecting scene. The one who was most affected by all this was Tariq 'Aziz who had a close, honorable friendship with Ghanim 'Abd-al-Jalil.

But Saddam Husayn, as those who know him say, is true to his name. He strikes when a matter has to do with the security of the party and the safety of the revolution. To him, these are not matters for jest or for playing with fire. He has become well-known for his shock tactics through which he has been able to maintain cohesion in the party in spite of internal and foreign attempts to discredit the party. He has been able to promote the status of his government in the midst of complex Arab and international policies and situations which can only be compared this time to the shock he suffered from the coup that colleagues dear to him [had engineered] against him during the first days of his term of office. He addressed them on the first day and said, "I am one standard among many; I am not the only standard. I am a knight among many; I am not the only knight. I am a leader among many, and I am not the only leader.

Yes, indeed, he uses shock tactics and he has been shocked!

MINISTER ADDRESSES ARAB ECONOMIC COUNCIL IN TUNISIA

Baghdad INA in Arabic 1340 GMT 3 Sep 79 JN

[Excerpts] Al-Suwaysah, 3 Sep--Iraqi RCC member and minister of trade Hasan 'Ali has called for the adoption of a strategy of joint Arab action, to pave the way for an Arab economic summit conference.

In a speech he made at the opening of the Arab Economic Council's 27th Session here today, 'Ali proposed that a top level governmental committee be summoned to meet within 2 months, to discuss and approve this strategy in its final form and to submit it to an extraordinary meeting of the council, to be held at a later date.

'Ali, who is heading the meetings of the current session, said that the session is a new turning point, requiring an honest and committed review of all previous achievements, within the framework of joint Arab economic action, and an assessment of achievements in the field of economic integration.

'Ali also called for a practical assessment of the activities and results of the work of Arab organizations and institutions as a means of achieving national goals. He said that the objective of joint Arab projects should be to consolidate Arab economic integration and bolster the link between domestic and pan-Arab development, in order to achieve the central goal, which is comprehensive Arab unity.

'Ali asserted the need for commitment by all Arab countries to a joint Arab strategy for achieving Arab national and economic security, making this strategy the backbone of the Arab countries' domestic plans in terms of their goals and priorities.

'Ali warned against the multinational companies that are undertaking study and implementation of most industrial projects in the Arab homeland. He said these companies are seeking to take advantage of their relations with certain Arab countries, in order to link them to the economies of the advanced industrial countries and to the international markets, as well as

to these companies' major centers abroad. He said this would obstruct the development of domestic and pan-Arab markets, which are necessary for any independent domestic or pan-Arab development.

'Ali said that there is a need to achieve Arab self-sufficiency in food supplies because of the gravity of the world's dependence on the capitalist market. This dependence would create a new factor in subservience to the international market. The matter is rendered even more serious by the fact that the entire grain trade is under the control of ten international capitalist companies, particularly U.S. companies.

'Ali said that stopping the Zionist enemy's expansion and foiling its designs against the Arab nation require, above all else, the consolidation of the Arab nation's defense base. He noted that this is a joint Arab task, particularly as it has become evident that the Zionist danger is not only a military menace but an economic menace as well.

'Ali asserted that this need required an Arab strategy for economic confrontation, through utilization of the elements of intrinsic Arab power; the achievement of economic cooperation and integration in various forms; the consolidation of joint Arab development and regional development within the pan-Arab sphere; the expansion of joint Arab projects that serve the goals of liberation, development and integration; better utilization of the Arab economic boycott weapon in terms of organization and content; and absolute commitment to implementation of the decisions made in this regard.

'Ali warned that Zionist designs are intended to impose "subservient integration on the Arab area, to replace the equitable Arab integration and to present a mideastern market--with its inequitable relations--as an alternative to the common Arab market." He also warned against exploitation of the Arabs' natural and manpower resources in support of the Zionist economy and of its attempt to impose its hegemony on the Arab area.

'Ali said that the Arab countries have again proven their genuine, humanitarian solidarity with the fraternal developing countries, through their unconditional financial and technical assistance. Proceeding from this, the Iraqi government has decided to take the initiative in compensating the poor developing countries that are currently linked with Iraq by direct oil contracts, by countering any increases in the official prices of Iraqi oil from 1 June 1979 through the end of the year with long-term, interest-free loans to these countries, equalling the rise in oil prices, in the hope that a serious and fair solution can be found for this issue.

CSO: 4802

'DAVAR' COMMENTATOR ON COMMUNIST ISOLATION IN WEST BANK

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Sep 79 p 9 TA

[Commentary by Dani Rubinstein: "New Phenomena in the Territories"]

[Text] The visit by the PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat to Amman, a first visit to the Jordanian capital since 1970, was the peak of the increasing cooperation between the PLO and Jordan. This is a cooperation which was already being observed in the work of the two sides' joint committee work in Jordan. The results of the committee and the Jordanian-PLO cooperation can be seen in the administered territories when we examine some new and interesting phenomena.

The first outstanding phenomenon is the flow of larger and larger sums of money into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These are sums earmarked at the Baghdad conference which met in order to determine the steps against the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations. The Arab countries set up a huge fund for aid to the Palestinian opponents of the Israeli-Egyptian agreements, and a considerable portion of the fund was specifically meant for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Thus, the Arab world, which fears Palestinians' incorporation in the autonomy negotiations, is holding onto the inhabitants of the territories with the help of large-scale financial aid, whose allocation to the territories is directed by the joint Jordanian-PLO committee. Those receiving the funds in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are mainly public institutions. The Muslim WAQF--which is receiving a similar sum--philanthropic organizations, various development plants and education and welfare institutions, have recently begun to benefit from this aid.

A second phenomenon is the appeasement between the traditional leadership which is considered to be pro-Jordan (people such as Nusayba, Frayj, the al-Masri family in Nabulus) and the younger, more radical leadership such as the mayors of Ramallah and Nabulus, who are identified with the PLO and even describe themselves as PLO men. As far back as several months ago the Jordanians confiscated the passport of Karim Khalaf, the mayor of Ramallah, at the Allenby bridge, when he was trying to cross to the east and he was forced to go back like someone who had been expelled from there. Now Khalaf has again gone to Amman, according to the press reports, was received with warmth there.

In the aftermath of the Camp David agreements, the PLO's enthusiastic supporters in the West Bank feared that Arab leaders and representatives, who would agree to take part in the autonomy negotiations, would be found in the West Bank. They boycotted and condemned people who met with U.S. diplomats or who visited Israel, and although at a rally held in the Bethlehem University, al-Shak'ah from Nabulus and Khalaf from Ramallah had publicly refused to shake the outstretched hand of Ilyas Frayj, the mayor of Bethlehem. Later when Frayj, as the director general of the Arab Electricity Corporation, became involved in a dispute with the workers, Khalaf, al-Suwayti (the mayor of Jericho) and others issued a statement of support for him and forgot that only a few months previously they had treated him almost as a traitor. The cooperation between the PLO and Jordan is, therefore, sending out rays from Amman to Nabulus and Hebron and dictating a new internal-political deployment here.

The new phenomenon, which, although yet unclear, is for the moment more interesting than any other, and is increasing the rivalry in the administered territories between the communists and all the rest, including the supporters of Jordan and of the PLO. It could be assumed that this rivalry is also demonstrating itself in the work of the Jordanian-PLO committee in Amman.

In principle, the opening of a campaign against the Communist Party in the territories in an attempt to isolate it is one of the narrow fields in which the PLO and Jordan can find a common language. In Jordan the communists have been loathed (and banned by law) for a long time, and in the PLO as well--and especially in Fatah--the Communist Party is not too popular.

The rivalry with the communists emerged to the surface most strikingly and vigorously last week, when a banner-headlined report was published on the communists' preparations for a separate electoral campaign and on their candidate for the elections to the West Bank municipalities, in the East Jerusalem paper AL QUDS (which is considered to be close to Jordan). This report hinted that the communists, who have up to now been part of the radical wing support in the PLO, have, as it were, abandoned it. In other words, the communists, who appeared in the last elections in one national bloc--in the various municipal lists--together with the supporters of the PLO, have either now been expelled from or left this bloc, and their place is being taken by the supporters of Jordan--a sort of changing of the guards. The communists have a notable representation today in almost all of the large urban councils in the West Bank, and, as far as I could discover, they were fairly surprised at this report. Nobody knows what decisions have recently been made by the communist leadership in the West Bank. These are secret decisions, and, generally speaking, the whole party is organized in a clandestine manner, as it is outlawed by Jordan. However, the communist leaders are known to all: (Bashir Barhumil), (Taysir 'Aruri), (Resan Hereb) from the Ramallah region, (Haldoun 'Abd al-Haq) in Nabulus, and Dr Hamda al-Natsha, George (Hezbon) and (Attala Rishmawi) in the Hebron and Bethlehem districts. These are today trying to repel the attacks against them and they are vigorously denying that they planned to get organized for a separate struggle without the other nationalist forces.

(Bashir Barhum), the editor of the East Jerusalem leftist weekly (AL-TALI'AH) published a most sharp article against the AL-QUDS paper's accusations. All of a sudden it emerged that this was a comprehensive campaign which had been going on under the surface for many weeks already. The communist spokesman revealed that the preachers in the mosques had begun to bitterly attack the communists. These preachers ([hataba] in Arabic) and the other members of the Muslim administrative staff are appearing almost everywhere in villages and towns in the West Bank and are making use of the Muslim revival, (the Khomeynism), especially against the communists. (In my evaluation, there is a relatively high percentage of Christians among the communists, something which, of course, is helping the Muslim preachers). As part of the attacks against the communists, reports have begun to appear in AL-QUDS and also in Jordanian papers, such as AL RA'I, that nonparty bodies are now getting organized in the West Bank toward the possibility of municipal elections. Here again, the intention is clear: the communists, who are the "party people," will no longer be allowed to enter into a partnership with the non-party national front getting organized in the West Bank. It is a reasonable possibility that the PLO loyalists in the territories have been issued specific instructions by the committee in Jordan to cooperate with the traditional leadership, and that the latter is prepared for this--on condition that the communists are expelled. This, as far as can be seen, is a part of the price the PLO is prepared to pay both to the Kingdom of Jordan and to countries such as Saudi Arabia, and to various Western elements, in order to achieve recognition, legitimacy and aid. The split with the communists, which is becoming increasingly more severe in the Arab public, is the subject of the talks and deliberations being held today in the West Bank, in the shadow of the other dramatic developments at whose center is the PLO.

CSO: 4805

AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS STILL STRONG DESPITE REPORTED CHANGE

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 8 Aug 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Two Faces for Same Coin"]

[Text] In two statements given to the press, yesterday, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan chose to fabricate a crisis in the American-Israeli relations that undoubtedly embodies a lot of joint persistence on manipulating the destiny of this region. In the light of these two statements, we need not review, anew, the formula of the American-Israeli relationship from the time Israel was established until today, even if some Arabs began to race with the developments and discuss in detail the future of this formula for well-known and obvious purposes.

Moshe Dayan was not the first Israeli government official to express "concern" about what was described by certain political circles as a drift in the United States policies in a way threatening the security of Israel. The Israeli Cabinet, in the absence of Menahem Begin, devoted its weekly meeting last Sunday to studying the avowed negative development in the Washington attitude toward the written and unwritten alliances with Israel owing to the stifling energy crisis threatening the United States and the future of its President as well...a crisis that forced the American government to escalate its efforts to come to an understanding with the Arabs against the interests of Israel, etc.

Although the Israeli Government decided to keep those decisions that it took in that session to itself, rather than convey them to Washington, and although the Cabinet felt that it was enough to ask the Israeli ambassador in Washington to inform the American Government of the Israeli position and although that move categorically emphasized Israel's realization of the significance of the above-mentioned alliances, yet some people, including Moshe Dayan, still persist in seeing things as reflected by concave mirrors, at times, and by convex mirrors at other times.

Furthermore, we are accustomed not to consider the statements of the Israeli officials seriously. Dayan himself alone had made many statements and later on denied them, even before the ink with which they were printed became dry. The same is true about other Israeli officials.

In fact, what attracts attention is the insistence of some Israelis on ignoring the flood of frequent American assurances of the Carter government's commitment to its well-known attitudes toward Israel, the PLO and the Arab cause, in general. Even if we assume that there is a reason for this fear and concern about the so-called "change" in the American policy and the American proposals for solving the crisis in the region, yet, with this assumption, what then are the new American attitudes creating concern among the Israeli rulers and elation among the American-Arabs?

For the sake of recalling the past experiences, we cite the following fact:

1. The American Government is still committed to the collective defense pacts with Israel. A quick review of the provisions of these treaties will show their many dimensions and aims.

6800

CSO: 4802

AMERICAN ROLE IN PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY TALKS DISCUSSED

Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 6 Aug. 79 p 1

[Editorial: "Haifa Talks"]

[Text] Today, in Haifa, the fifth round of the autonomy talks will begin at the Karmel Hotel, while the American aircraft carrier Independence is anchored in the port of Haifa, as if it is supervising the negotiations in which the United States plays the role of full partner, or as if the negotiators, who could see the American naval ship from the hotel where the talks are held, depend on the symbol of American muscle in their negotiations and policies.

It is expected that this round will not produce substantial results despite the fact that it will be held at a high level. This expectation is attributed to two reasons: First, the fact that American-Israeli relations are currently passing through a stage of coolness owing to the new American attitudes toward the Palestine Liberation Organization, on the one hand, and because of the proposals offered by the American delegation during the talks of the self-rule working committees held in Alexandria, on the other hand. The American delegation demanded that the proposed Palestinian autonomy authority be invested with legislative, executive and judicial powers.

The second reason lies in the forthcoming meeting in Haifa, early next month, between President Anwar Sadat and Prime Minister Menahem Begin. Lessons of the past have shown that the summit conferences render other meetings as mere intermissions that neither solve nor tackle the substantive issues which usually are left to the leaders to deal with.

So far, it is clear that the American assurances and pledges to Israel have failed to alleviate Israeli concerns about a possible change in Washington's attitude toward the Palestinian cause and the PLO itself.

However, yesterday, the Israeli Cabinet, in its weekly meeting, avoided an open confrontation with the American Government. It abstained from issuing a statement about its decisions. Instead, the Cabinet felt that it was enough to relay its decisions to Washington through the Israeli ambassador there. As expected, the Cabinet reiterated its position rejecting negotiations with the PLO.

6800

CSO: 4802

LACK OF INTRA-GOVERNMENT COORDINATION CRITICIZED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 31 Jul 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Discipline of Coordinating Positions"]

[Text] Among the "defects" in government functioning, as the prime minister referred to at the time as defects requiring correction, is sometimes the absence of coordination between offices in day to day matters.

Here the minister of foreign affairs complained about visits of public figures to Egypt not authorized by his office at the time when each visit should have been approved by the Foreign Ministry. When different parties deal with these visits without central control there may be failures in the visits, the meetings, or the declarations issued.

The minister of foreign affairs continued that certain ministers in their talks with the American special envoy and other ambassadors sometimes present political positions which do not correlate with the political line of the government. Each minister expresses before the ambassadors of foreign countries his personal opinions.

So far we have heard voices on the non-existence of coordination in economic matters between ministers of economic offices who are from the same party. Now we see a similar complaint in the political arena. The minister of foreign affairs raised an example of lack of coordination at the time of the visit of the senior American representative who is in charge of United Nations matters. Certain ministers have announced to him their readiness to replace the Emergency Force of the United Nations while the government is conducting a fight against an arrangement of United Nations observers, which is in contrast to the Camp David agreements. Certain ministers say that the positioning of UN observers should not be judged too critically. The government has decided that the minister of foreign affairs and not the minister of defense will participate in Washington at discussions of the international power that will be positioned in the Sinai to replace the Emergency Force. The government has chosen as its representative the minister of foreign affairs both because he received the invitation from the American secretary of state and because he expresses the majority opinion.

The prime minister, upon his return to good health and work, will have among other things to give his opinion on the removal of these difficulties which cause hindrance to the government's work.

ISRAEL

EQUITABLE AGREEMENT WITH BEDOUINS URGED

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 1 Aug 79 p 2

[Editorial: "The Law, the Bedouins, and Their Jewish Supporters"]

[Text] The struggle of the Bedouins against the Law of Freezing which was suggested to the Knesset, is not free of political orientation. Also the Jewish support given to them by circles whose purpose is to aggravate the government, is not free of political orientation. Everyone knows that this is not arbitrary nationalization of land. These lands are necessary to the security of Israel for the placement of airfields following the need to evacuate the Sinai desert. Everyone knows that there is no free time for tiring bargaining of financial blackmail within the pressure of time according to the timetable set in the peace treaty.

These facts are well-known to all those stirring this pot, and we emphasize that it is easier to understand the Bedouins fighting for their rights rather than those kicking the stirrups. They [those trying to kick the stirrups] try to exploit the opportunity to prod the government. It is not the sense of justice and not the evil that was done to this group of citizens that is kicking the stirrups of the supporters, openly, secretly, and those who are less than secretive [sic]. The purposes are political and cannot be masked.

The demonstrations that took place the day before yesterday unveiled their targets. The combination of Bedouins in the Negev and Galil villagers revealed their purposes. The rebellion reeked of the slogans chanted. "Jews out of the Galil," was worrying. The identification with the PLO and a Palestinian state reveals inclinations that presumably were hidden. The Palestinian state does not want to limit itself to the West Bank of the Jordan and to Gaza. The final target is the destruction of the Israeli state and the establishment in its place of the Palestinian state. But the goal is clear.

The government cannot and does not want to deny the legitimate rights of the Bedouins. The need to compensate them with land or money is self-explanatory. With good spirit it is possible to reach agreement with each tribe. The percentage of land cultivated is not that large out of the 80,000 dunums

about to be nationalized. Only a very small fraction is cultivated or settled. All in all, it is a matter of a few hundred families, part of whom are willing to move. Some are willing to move of their own volition under acceptable conditions. There is a feeling that somebody is inflaming the Bedouins. The initiative that the Alignment took to introduce corrections in the proposed bill revealed political maturity. A responsible party cannot avoid such an essential necessity as building airfields which means the peace treaty structure. The government, for its part, moved halfway toward the Alignment with the purpose of removing the sting from the suggested bill.

To reach an early communication with the Bedouins and to avoid a clash which would not have added political power there is a need to encourage the government to move towards concessions, even far-reaching ones. Not once has the government surrendered to blackmail of Jews. Still ahead of us are trials of this kind from some of the settlements in the Sinai. The cost is worthwhile anyway, naturally in a reasonable framework.

But revelations which accompanied this battle can cause insomnia. There are expressions of the inflaming of rebellion: Wrong intervention of Jews, of giving active support, and not last an expression of identification with the inclinations of the PLO in all that regards the country's future. The demonstrations and all that accompanied them are among the things which are not sympathetic in the given conditions when Israel is forced to fight with friendly political powers over our rights in this country.

9182

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

POPULATION BALANCE IN GALIL DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 31 Jul 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Rapid Jewish Population in the Galil"]

[Text] The majority of the thousands of Arabs who demonstrated yesterday outside the Knesset against "stealing their lands" came from villages in the Galil, and some were Bedouins from the Negev.

The Galil Arabs, inflamed by nationalistic and communistic circles, do not look favorably on the building of Jewish units in the area. With their goal of becoming the majority in the area, in the absence of wide continuous Jewish settlement in the area, over the years they have been taking over lands, without government permission, and adding them to their properties.

Since Jews recently began building settlements on government lands without hurting Arab lands, the Arabs reacted with demonstrations, as though their lands were being taken from them for the Jews.

Those who demonstrated yesterday in front of the Knesset shouted inflammatory statements against the State of Israel.

The heads of the Jewish settlement in the Galil explained at a press conference that in fact those taking over lands illegally until now have been the Arabs, and if the government nationalizes lands for its needs, the lands taken from Jews were greater than those taken from Arabs. They proved their statements with facts.

The Arab demonstrators cried, "Get out, Jews from the Galil." The lawful answer is that there should be great and rapid Jewish settlement in the lands of the Galil. A definite Jewish majority must be created in the area.

As to the law for nationalization of lands in the Negev for building airfields to replace those in the Sinai, their building must be executed in a defined time. Its reading was postponed until today. It looks as if there is the chance of an arrangement with the Bedouins on the amount of reparations, determining of territories for their settlement and the borders of nationalized lands. Here the most essential security considerations are the determinant.

GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED FOR LACK OF SOUND ECONOMIC POLICY

Tel Aviv HAZOFEH in Hebrew 31 Jul 79 p 2

[Editorial: "After Failure of Lack of Confidence Move"]

[Text] The majority in the Knesset which failed the motions of lack of confidence in the government, which were submitted before the House recessed, believes that a considerable portion of the economic crisis was passed on by the Labor government to this government. With loud motions for lack of confidence, without suggesting a practical program for solving the crisis, there is no way to slow the galloping inflation. The position of the majority in the Knesset represents the opinion of the majority of the public.

By preventing complete immediate cancellation of the subsidies, the government prevented serious shock, soaring prices and the need for great compensation to the poor. In his response to the speakers of the Opposition, the minister of finance set the principle of gradually eliminating the subsidies, while necessarily preserving the balance between decreasing wasteful spending and preserving the minimal standard of living of the masses.

He emphasized the means taken to slow the inflation, such as the cutting of 12 billion Israeli pounds from the budget, reduction of building that is not housing, and turning of resources to building housing for those in need of it, increased deepening of tax collection, etc.

In addition to these means there is need for an encompassing economic plan, which suggests solutions and suggests ways for their execution. At its center should be the slowing of inflation, reduction of the subsidies with compensation for the lower economic classes and larger families, and energetic dedication to solving the housing shortage. It is desirable that the government involve the Histadrut in its economic activities.

Any program which is brought before the government and accepted will have its execution dependent upon inter-office cooperation, upon continual program advances, and on emergency-type operation. It is the duty of the government to overcome mistakes of the past and to demonstrate greater alertness in its economic policy toward all its sections and details. It must show great ability in the economic and social areas.

MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING, SAID INCOMPETENT

Jerusalem HAMODI'A in Hebrew 1 Aug 79 p 2

[Editorial: "Not a Good Message"]

[Text] The prices of apartments will rise by approximately 20 percent this month following a considerable increase in cost of housing materials. This not-good message came from the president of the contractors Avraham Shperling at the Economic Committee of the Knesset at the time of the discussion on the housing shortage. The details given by Mr Shperling, intended to explain the great increase, contain not even a half consolation.

Whoever goes to buy an apartment next month, and it must be assumed that the contractors will push forward the rise in prices and certainly will raise the prices of apartments that are not subject to supervision and inspection, will have to seek a source of a few thousand extra Israeli pounds, and if he does not succeed in doing this, will be forced to remain without a roof over his head if we speak of a young couple seeking to build their home and new family, or if speaking of citizens who live in deprived conditions, they will be forced to squeeze even more into a small apartment.

It is possible to agree with the chairman of the company Shikun Ovdim [Worker's Housing], who said before the committee that this is a "time bomb," and it is possible to add that the time remaining until it explodes is not very long. In fact it already is hurting thousands of young couples who cannot get an apartment in which to open the new chapter in their lives.

There is no comfort whatsoever in what was said by the minister of construction and housing, David Levi, at the committee. The ideas of shortening the lengthy procedures for permission on revision of taxes on building materials and neutralizing the cost of property have floated around for years, and we find it difficult to understand. Why is his office only now investigating the ideas, and is it not possible to shorten the amount of time needed for these investigations? We want to add that these ideas are not the only ones that it is possible to raise in order to solve this great shortage, which is growing in severity as time passes.

The impression in the society has been created that the Ministry of Construction and Housing reveals incompetence. The shortage did not suddenly occur. This is not an unpredictable natural disaster. It was entirely predictable. Is it permissible for us to suspect that there is someone who wants to cause the failure of Mr Levy, or the fall of the government? We would not reach such conclusions without first making a thorough examination. But the suspicions exist, and it is the duty of the minister of construction and housing to carefully examine the reasons which prevented his office up to now from preparing a program for the hour of emergency which would lighten the shortage, and stop the rise in prices. If prices continue to rise at this pace they are liable to reach astronomical heights.

This is the problem of problems of the society. This problem is affecting the structure of life. It causes emigration from the country, shakes the stability, slows development and commands cutting the size of families and postponing the start of new families. It deepens the bitterness in wide circles. the demonstrations on this matter are the beginning of the glacier.

The Ministry of Construction and Housing, which has this economy under its hand, must wake up. Begin new initiatives, even daring ones, in order to reach a quick, acceptable solution. This is a test for the Israeli society, a test for the government, and if it will succeed in this point, the nation will be grateful to it.

9182

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

INCREASE IN CARTER'S POPULARITY--The popularity of the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, is higher in Israel than in America. While the number of those displeased with their President there is higher than 70 percent, in Israel those displeased with Carter's relating to Israel is only about 20 percent--it appears from a national opinion poll of the PURI Institute, made at the request of HA'ARETZ. "Displeased with the way President Carter relates to Israel?"; 41.1 percent answered affirmatively and 20.8 percent negatively. Another 32.2 percent are satisfied "more or less." The question "Are you satisfied with Carter's relating to Israel and the 5.9 percent remaining have no opinion on Carter. [Sic. Text missing]. This is a considerable change compared to the situation in the past. A year ago only 11 percent of the Israeli general public were satisfied by the policy of President Carter toward Israel, and 52.8 percent said then that they were not satisfied with it. A half year ago 25.9 percent were satisfied with the way President Carter related to Israel and 27.2 percent were unsatisfied. The survey encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 men and women, who were interviewed personally in their homes in all parts of the country. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Aug 79 p 3] 9182

CSO: 4805

'AL-DUSTUR' SAYS ZIONIST MOVEMENT MANIPULATES U.S. POLICY

Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 0515 GMT 31 Aug 79 JN

[Article from the Press Review]

[Text] Today AL-DUSTUR discusses the accusations which the Camp David sides have begun to exchange on the autonomy negotiations and the vicious circle these negotiations have fallen.

AL-DUSTUR says: Egypt says that Israel is placing obstacles and barriers in the way of the negotiations. Nevertheless, Egypt says that it is always optimistic such obstacles and barriers can be overcome. Meanwhile, the United States is preoccupied with attempts to reconcile what it wants with what it hopes for, and what satisfies Israel with what dissatisfies it. Israel is confident of its military strength and hopes that through this military strength, it can achieve all its expansionist ambitions in the Arab world without anyone's help.

AL-DUSTUR adds: Only yesterday, Dayan attacked U.S. policy makers and accused them of making mistakes preventing the success of the Camp David agreements. Who was deceiving whom at Camp David? Who made the mistake in the United States, if the man who shook hands with the PLO representative was forced to resign and if every U.S. official who criticizes the hegemony of the Zionist lobby over the U.S. administration is either forced to swallow his statements or be discharged from his post? Is it President Carter, whom the Zionist movement is now threatening with a new Watergate, that made the mistake; or was it Secretary of State Vance, National Security Adviser Brzezinski or Robert Strauss who made the mistake? There is a suppressed clamor involving them which might lead to the chopping off of more than one head.

AL-DUSTUR concludes: The tragedy of the U.S. administration is that it cannot reconcile the very good intentions of the Arabs, who are seeking a just and objective solution to the Arab issue, with the unlimited Zionist ambitions in the Arab world. The climax of the tragedy is that the United States has become a puppet in the hands of the Zionist movement which is dragging it into positions which do not serve the interests of the United States and make these interests a target of real destruction by blindly following the Zionist designs.

GOVERNMENT'S PRESS POLICIES EXAMINED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 17 Jul 79 pp 18-20

[Article: "Kuwait Will Not Benefit From Transforming Its Press Into Trumpets of Praise and Its Journalists Into Yes Men!"]

[Text] What does a newspaper's suspension from publication mean? Questions such as this require no great intelligence. It is clear that suspension means preventing the newspaper from addressing the people no matter what their inclinations, and consequently preventing it from declaring in one way or another a point of view or a position. With respect to political newspaper, AL-TALI'AH is one of the political papers, and the ban takes on a more sensitive character in view of what the political question represents in terms of the importance of control at the present time. That is to say, it takes on the character of preventing a position regarding existing policies from being accentuated, whether they be local or Arab or international, or rather it goes beyond that to prevent the spreading of information regarding the facts of any given policy.

If this question has a more than obvious answer, the second question is still without a clear answer. It is: What is the truth of the "AL-TALI'AH problem," or to be more exact, what has changed AL-TALI'AH in the view of some into a problem?!

To answer this question, we should look at the matter from three angles.

First, the newspaper is considered a problem if it has "damaged" relations with certain regimes.

Second, the newspaper is considered a problem if it has violated the official custom of expecting praise and appreciation for everything that comes from on high.

Third, the newspaper is considered a problem if it has neglected the peripheral issues and has spoken only about the basic, gut issues.

In accordance with these three aspects, let us look at the nature of the press, the nature of the relationship between citizen and state, and the nature of the relationship between citizen and any given issue.

If we examine these points of view in light of the contemporary nature of the press by describing it as one of the institutions which cannot exist unless it is free, in light of the contemporary aspects of the relationship between citizen and state by characterizing it as a joint relationship and not the relationship of sovereign with inferior, and in light of the contemporary nature of the relationship between citizen and any given issue by describing it as a direct, personal relationship, if we examine all of this we reach the conclusion that the newspaper is not "the problem" but it is a "problem" of another view of each of these three aspects. The reasons are these:

First, it is logical that the Arab regime which has vast media apparatus with thousands of employees and bureaus would defend "the truth" which it possesses, if it has any truth, whenever it is subject to the spurious or false, for instance, by refuting what any newspaper publishes or by debating it if it articulates a political opinion or position, as AL-TALI'AH did, but it is illogical that it should demand the suspension of the newspaper or the impounding of what it tells the people. The word people and masses is repeated on official tongues a hundred times a day, and it is not inappropriate to say that officials are in the people's and masses' service, but do many at least respect the masses' intelligence, rely on their judgment, and are they, as is said at times, the source of legality, authority, and the justification of a regime or a president's existence...or a sultan's?!

Of course it is not too much for the masses to have this right, because theirs is an established, enduring human right which does not require anyone's concurrence.

At this point let's look at the political attitude which some Arab quarters follow, an attitude which differs with the differing position of these quarters, whether outside of authority or seizing authority. We have experience in this regard that tells us that political quarters which hasten to deny or debate are those whose position is outside of authority, i.e., at a time in which they do not possess the means of suppressing thought. However, no sooner do these quarters seize power than we see them discarding behind their backs whatever relationship they had with dialogue and begin to rely on demands for suppression, confiscation and suspension, i.e., the prevention of opposing views from surfacing, not just inside their country but also in the other Arab countries. Naturally these quarters do not risk demanding a non-Arab country to following this example, because they would encounter an unpleasant response.

Second, the lack of inclination for the arguments of others [word illegible] political opponents stems from self-weakness whether in thought or authoritative behavior and does not stem from [word illegible] power. We know that there is a distinction between a criminal who perpetrates a crime, the only thing one can do with him is restrain him, and the authors of a political position. Unless this distinction exists in the minds of the regimes, their widespread practice will continue to be to read the elaborations of praise and not tolerate or believe that there is anyone on the face of the earth who

those who assist in establishing this official custom are a type of specimen which some newspapers foster themselves in their own milieu, the "panegyric press" or the "diversionary press." We call this kind of journalism the kind that does a brisk trade in giving the regime what it wants the regime to see and hear, while keeping from it what is actually going on in politics, the economy and society. However, it is only intelligent people in whom examples of such newspapers as these evoke feelings of repugnance and disquiet.

Third, it is evident from the official, public atmosphere in the Arab nations that what is wanted from the press or from any media means is for it to remain on the periphery, that is to discuss the marginal and unimportant issues, instead of delving deeply in a more comprehensive manner behind the facade of an event or policy or conduct or idea. This obviously is not the only result of "peripheralizing" the people.

This astonishing logic, at a time in which theoretically one is urging the progress of the nation and its prosperity and the responsibility of the citizen for the nation's security, deprives the nation of any possibility of progress by robbing the citizen of any capability to have contact with the public issues, through a hidden pretext that there are those who think about these public issues on behalf of the people and that all the multitude has to do is to accept their beliefs from on high and then undertake their responsibility! You see, how can a citizen be placed on "the periphery" far from issues which govern his destiny and then undertake any action? How remarkable it is to bear this ambiguous word "responsibility!"

From this point of departure, the press and especially the newspapers of political opinions, try to give this citizen a share in the responsibility by giving him the information, information regarding his local, Arab, and international issues. That is to say in a more precise way, it tries to extract him from the condition of "peripheralization" in which the official regimes have placed him. We are able to cite several examples of results of "peripheralization" conditions which are going on before our eyes. On the national level, it made a man's heart bleed to witness the Zionist raids; they destroyed Arab lands and overcame heavily-populated cities with small numbers of troops. The heart bled that the Arab inhabitants should be cut off from information and weapons, rank after rank of them witnessing the occupation of their cities and villages by force, not only that but also their not knowing the meaning of what was happening, at the same time in which this regime or that was giving the citizens a headache by proclaiming "mobilize energies," "the need to confront the enemy," "sacrifice in the cause of struggle," etc., and silencing the opposition or crushing it! On the local level, we cannot perceive the distinction in accusing the people of negativism in responding to an economic or social policy while at the same time these people do not know the economic or social facts regarding it!

What we hear about "the citizen's negativism" or "his unwillingness to sacrifice" is only the result of "peripheralization" which is pursued deliberately and with premeditation whether in the fields of information or behavior. A nation cannot make progress with a people who are placed on the "periphery," since nation means the people in that nation and not the names of the cities, the location of the borders, or the names of the streets. These three reasons are what caused AL-TALI'AH to be a problem, and in the literal sense, as we have made clear, it is a problem.

EDITORIAL SAYS PLO RAIDS ONLY BENEFIT EGYPT

Kuwait AL-SATAN in Arabic 15 Jul 79 p 1

[Editorial by Fu'ad Matar: "The Ankara Raid; Blood Shall Not Be Like Water"]

[Text] We see no benefit from the attack which was aimed at the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, and before that the Cyprus operation whose victim was the writer Yusef al-Saba'i. No Cyprus operation stopped President Sadat's impetus toward concluding the pact with Israel, and no Ankara attack will cause President Sadat to instantly forsake the pact which he concluded with Israel.

Therefore, why threaten innocent persons in a raid which we do not believe to be courageous but is only one of the easy operations at a time when operations which of themselves could cause pain to President Sadat's regime and could damage Israel are not being done.

It was within the power of the Arab states or some of them at least to deter President Sadat, he could not go far; however, no one made that decision, knowing that it was very clear from the time he declared his readiness to visit Israel that he had chosen the path which he is even now still pursuing.

In this Ankara operation we noted Arab awareness and the haste of certain Arab quarters to contain the operation in such a way as to not cause victims. It is certain that were it not for this speed, the raid would have turned into a real tragedy and Arab blood would have flowed copiously. Retaliation would have been taken, and then retaliatory attacks would occur in Egypt which the Egyptian regime would be powerless to stop.

This awareness to which we referred means that blood cannot become something like unexpected water. Preventing the turning of this operation into a bloody tragedy confirms a basic matter, which is that operations such as these should not gain Arab legitimacy, starting from the fact that punishing the Egyptian regime should not include the people of Egypt. We should make it sufficiently clear that imposing penalties on the Egyptian regime does not mean outlawing the Egyptians, and make it even more clear that there is still an Arab distinction between the enemy and the attempt at reconciliation between Egypt and this enemy. However, the important thing is that the Egyptian people understand that, and that it is stressed that the thing which prevented the operation from turning into a tragedy was the speed of certain Arab and Islamic countries to settle it, not the commandos whom President Sadat sent nor even Dr Mustafa Khalil's threats nor Husni Mubarak's security tactics.

When the Egyptian people understand that, Egypt will once again be a fortress for the national struggle, and its embassies will once again be a target.

To reiterate, and until what we referred to occurs, there is no benefit from operations such as the Ankara attack. The Egyptian regime which read in the book of peace with Israel is the beneficiary. What is required is the restoration of Egypt, not the creation of justifications for this regime in order that it can continue fanning the fires of Egyptian chauvanism and spreading Egyptian hatred against Arabism, the Palestinian question and Palestinians.

7005

CSO: 4802

SADDAM HUSAYN SAID MORE THAN A 'STRONG MAN'

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 18 Jul 79 p 1

[Editorial by Fu'ad Matar: "The Deputy Is No Longer a Deputy"]

[Text] After today the news agencies and the press, when they mention the name of Saddam Husayn, will not say "the strong man" in Iraq. This label was tied to him, and the tacit understanding was that "the deputy" was the strongest.

In practice, Saddam Husayn was first in making decisions, and second in protocol lists. That is a situation in which there is a great deal of distinction, and because of this situation, the Arab and international media dealt with reports of Saddam Husayn and his statements on the basis that they were the position.

When Saddam Husayn assumed the three leaderships, state, revolution, and party, and in these circumstances alone, that means that it is important that we start now to expect decisions which will earn the fateful label and which will require less time and debate.

That does not mean that the decisions would not have been taken if the first formula had continued, but there are decisions which require a mind into which circumstances of health or the residue of a painful personal condition do not intrude. Moreover these decisions require less skill and more familiarity with opinion.

It is not clear what the effect will be of Saddam Husayn's assumption of the three leaderships with regard to the matter of unity with Syria and the tension existing between Iraq and Iran. However, it is time that these two matters were underlined, and the assumption is that the stumbling over achievement of unity with Syria and the tension with Iran occurred during the period which ended 2 days ago.

On this basis a new picture of the facts of those two matters referred to certainly is to be expected. The new picture might include what would be likely to clarify why there was stumbling over the matter of unity and why there were sharp dealings with the revolution in Iran.

It remains to be seen whether the form in which the changeover was announced will clarify that the leadership of one generation has replaced the leadership of two generations, that civilian party leadership has replaced civilian-military party leadership, and that there will not be a second man in power.

It remains also to be seen whether what happened in Iraq was ultimately the decision of a party which found that the dual order was possible as long as it was composed of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn, but was impossible to continue with a person other than al-Bakr. It is also important that it was terminated at a time in which President al-Bakr's health permitted the party to issue a statement and to announce his resignation in favor of his deputy. In any event it is preferable to what would have been if President al-Bakr's health was of a serious nature, and has made the party more cohesive.

Cohesiveness of the party in Iraq is the foundation and the continuity.

To reiterate, from now on the news agencies and the press, when the name of Saddam Husayn is mentioned, will not repeat the label "strong man" in Iraq. The deputy is no longer a deputy.

7005

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

PALESTINIAN SALARY DEDUCTIONS--Mr 'Auni Battash, director of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Kuwait, has requested the government to reduce the deduction of amounts withheld from the salaries of Palestinians employed by the state to 3.5 percent instead of the 5 percent currently being paid. This follows the raise in salaries of state employees. Informed sources told AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM that Mr 'Auni Battash's memorandum, which was conveyed to al-Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmad, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, got its impetus from the PLO's executive committee's decision not to overburden Palestinian workers in the state, following the increase in employees' salaries. It is expected that this matter will be submitted to the Council of Ministers at its next session in order to obtain its decision. [Text] [Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 26 Jul 79 p 1] 7005

LEBANON

PREMIER GRANTS INTERVIEW TO JORDANIAN PAPER

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 2 Sep 79 p 13 JN

["Text" of interview with Dr Salim al-Huss, Lebanese Prime Minister, by Amman AL-RA'Y correspondent Amal 'Abbasi in Beirut--date not given]

[Excerpts] Question: What are the latest developments of the Lebanese issue?

Answer: Any discussion of the Lebanese issue is complicated because of its multifaceted aspects. The Lebanese issue encompasses many local and foreign dimensions. Today, when we discuss the Lebanese crisis it is the southern Lebanese area which is the most important aspect and which is directly connected to the area's cause, the Middle East cause. If we discuss Lebanon at this stage, we should concentrate on the southern issue and all its ramifications.

Question: What is the official position on Sa'd Haddad, those who are dealing with him and on some of the leaders who have publicly made statements about cooperating with Israel?

Answer: The position of Sa'd Haddad is known and clear. Sa'd Haddad is a rebel who deserted the army and cooperated with the Israeli enemy when this enemy struck at the army and those living peacefully in the south. When a Lebanese army regiment was sent to the south to support the Unifil forces, Sa'd Haddad announced the establishment of his state, which he called the state of free Lebanon. For this reason the Lebanese authority's position on Sa'd Haddad and his gang is explicit. Immediately disciplinary measures were taken against him, he was expelled from the Lebanese army and his case was brought before a military court. This the Lebanese government's position on Sa'd Haddad.

Question: Do you believe that national [wataniyah] reconciliation or national accord will be the key to solving the Lebanese problem?

[Answer] I do not want to discuss national reconciliation. What I am talking about is national accord, which is a formula containing solutions

to the country's basic problems. This formula might be submitted in one form or another and when this takes place all the Lebanese will rally around it on the basis that it contains common denominators over which all or the vast majority of the Lebanese are in agreement.

Question: What about the partitioning of Lebanon?

Answer: We have ruled out the idea of partitioning Lebanon. The vast majority of Lebanese citizens believe in Lebanon's territorial integrity and unity. Their belief is tested by their daily actions. Anyone who has doubts about this can go to the entrances of the eastern and western sectors of Beirut and see the traffic jams in these entrances. This is irrefutable proof that no one thinks about partitioning Lebanon. Therefore, this idea has no basis.

Question: Then how can you explain statements by some political leaders who stress the existence of and call for the partitioning of Lebanon?

Answer: I do not believe there are loyal Lebanese leaders who call for or believe in the idea of partitioning Lebanon.

Question: What are the ways and methods the Lebanese government can adopt to confront the development in the situation in the south?

Answer: As I said previously, there are a series of UN Security Council resolutions on southern Lebanon. The first is Resolution 425 while the last one was Resolution 450. Besides these two resolutions, other resolutions were issued with the purpose of renewing the Unifil mandate in southern Lebanon.

Our present concern is to follow up and fully implement UN resolutions in the south so that the Unifil forces, with the help of the Lebanese army, will be deployed over the entire area allocated to them.

As to the remaining part of southern Lebanon, that is the Tyre area and the area north of the Litani which does not fall within the Unifil's area of operations, they are still not under government control. The Lebanese government is trying to maintain its presence in this area and it also tries to coordinate with the PLO to control the situation. However, we have failed to achieve any progress in this respect to date. Despite all this we continue with our efforts to restore Lebanese sovereignty over the entire southern area without exceptions.

Question: You previously referred to cooperation with the PLO. What is the nature of the current relations between the Lebanese state and the Palestinians and Lebanon's opinion on attempts to resettle the Palestinians in southern Lebanon?

Answer: We are in constant contact with the PLO leaders and conduct a constant dialog with them on the situation in the south. We do so because of our concern over the interests and people of the south and also because

of our interest in securing their stability and providing them with the basic requirements of a dignified life. Therefore, the dialog always centers on the need to control the situation in the southern area, to refrain from carrying out any operations that would give the enemy an excuse to launch aggressions against Lebanon and to enable the state to regain full control through the reactivation of various state institutions and the return of Lebanese authority to all parts of southern Lebanon. Therefore, our constant dialog with the Palestinians deals with all these problems.

On Palestinian resettlement, we and the Palestinians reject the proposal that they be resettled outside their homeland. This idea also contradicts the Arab cause because the Palestinians have the right to return to their homeland and to establish their state there. This idea is rejected by both sides.

Question: There is a call now for convening an Arab summit conference to discuss the Lebanese situation. Do you believe that such a summit will contribute to the settlement of the crisis, given that many conferences were held in the past and no results ensued?

Answer: We consider the southern Lebanese issue a joint Arab cause. The question of dealing with it is an Arab responsibility. If the brother Arabs have not progressed to effectively help Lebanon overcome its problems in the south then they are shunning their responsibilities. It is incumbent for the Arabs to utilize all their potentials in supporting the south and the southerners and for finding a sound solution to this issue. It is true that there is Arab solidarity on the international level on the issue of southern Lebanon. This solidarity is evident when it is discussed by the UN Security Council. However, the Lebanese citizen feels that his Arab brothers have not provided him with sufficient support to strengthen the steadfastness of the Lebanese sons. Arab financial assistance to southern Lebanon has been limited compared to Lebanon's requirements at the present stage. We also do not feel that the Arabs have provided sufficient political and economic leverage to support Lebanon in confronting this problem.

Question: Syrian troops have been in Lebanon for a long time despite the objection of some parties. What is the nature of Syrian-Lebanese relations and what is your opinion on the presence of the Arab deterrent forces (ADF) in Lebanon?

Answer: Relations between us are normal. We have expressed this in our policy statement on the basis of which the present government won the vote of confidence in the chamber of deputies. We have expressed our support for the relations that exist between the two fraternal countries. As for the ADF, which is composed primarily of Syrian forces, they are in Lebanon now according to a Lebanese government's proposal. Therefore, their presence here stems from the wish and request of legitimate authorities. Therefore, the ADF is a legitimate force whose tasks have been spelled out by the resolution that established the ADF. These forces safeguard security in the areas in which they are stationed. Therefore, there are no problems about their presence.

NATION CALLS FOR ARAB UNITY TO FACE CONSPIRACY

Tripoli AL-USBU' AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Jul 79 p 1




Come, Brothers! We must unite to face the storm!

LIBYA

U.S. SEEN AS DESTINATION OF ARAB OIL, SOURCE OF ISRAELI WEAPONS

Tripoli AL-USBU' AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Jul 79 p 1



CSO: 4802

PAPER CALLS FOR UN MEASURES AGAINST ISRAEL

Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 26 Aug 79 p 1 LD

[Untitled editorial]

[Excerpts] While the savage Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon was escalating the United States issued a statement urging self-restraint, the United Nations, through its secretary general, Kurt Waldheim, warned against resorting to violence and this month's Security Council Chairman Andrew Young issued a statement calling for no escalation of the attacks, particularly against the UN Emergency Forces.

Israel will not be deterred by statements issued here or there, because aggression is a deep-rooted characteristic of the Zionist entity.

The Israeli military establishment's escalation of its savage aggression is in order to wipe out the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the one hand and to try to force Lebanon to accept direct negotiations so as to dictate Israeli terms and place Lebanon under total Israeli control.

We cannot expect the major powers or the United Nations or the Security Council to provide any real help since the world community has issued so many resolutions condemning Israel and the major powers have issued so many statements "condemning and repudiating" the Israeli aggressive policy. But Israel is no longer deterred by such statements and is in fact daily defying them with continued aggression against the Arab lands and Arab citizens.

If the United Nations is really serious about deterring Israel it must expel it from the world community or impose an economic boycott on the grounds that its aggressive existence and barbaric policy constitute a threat to world security and peace. Such a measure by the world community could achieve results, as in the case of South Africa. And until the world community adopts such measures we must arm ourselves with continued caution and vigilance to confront Israeli aggression against Lebanon or other countries.

CSO: 4802

COMMENTARY ON FRG ROLE IN FINDING MIDEAST SOLUTION

Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 26 Aug 79 LD

[Commentary by Husayn al-'Askari]

[Text] Hans-Dietrich Genscher today begins a tour of four Arab states to discuss the latest developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict and their link with the role of Western Europe in finding a solution to the conflict.

The importance of the FRG role in the search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict has been increasing day by day, despite the fact that the Bonn government so far has not recognized the PLO, a matter that reduces the effectiveness of the German role. But the national interest of the German people and its dependence on cooperation with the Arab world both in the fields of German imports of Arab oil and increasing Arab imports of German goods has made Germany eager to find a kind of balance in its relations with the Arab world and the Israeli enemy.

This balance, however, has lacked justice because it is not reasonable or acceptable that Germany should base its dealing with the Arab world and Israel on equal terms--that is, being even-handed in its relations with both. The Germans have felt the imbalance of this equality and have felt its adverse effect on their relations with the Arab world. Hence, they have made several moves to correct this. The results, however, remain below the desired level. Nor are they equal to the dimensions of the growing relations between the Arab world and Bonn.

On the basis of this reality comes the move of the German foreign minister to seek a formula acceptable to the parties to the conflict. The German role, however, quite frankly remains useless so long as caution remains the guiding factor in Bonn's attitudes in regard to dealing with the PLO, a factor which does not as a consequence provide any earnest conviction even in a lesser degree, in any German proposals. This, however, does not mean that the role of the FRG Government is small. However, the success of its endeavor basically depends on the extent of Bonn's appreciation of the justice of Palestinian demands and dealing

with these demands from a position of conviction and not sympathy, which remains in the realm of caution. The question that emerges through the current visit of the FRG foreign minister to four Arab states is this: Is the Bonn government today able to come forward with specific proposals, or is it still trying to gather information? It has taken a long time collecting this information without taking clear German stands.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

EXPERIMENTAL RICE FARM--Duein, July 2, (SUNA)--S. S. U Provincial Secretary and White Nile Commissioner Mohamed El Sayad El S. var attended Saturday the ceremonies of the handing over of the first phase of the rice experimental farm from the Government of Japan to the government of the Sudan. The Commissioner commended the efforts of the Japanese Company to complete the farm at the fixed time and hailed the cooperation between Japan and Sudan in this respect. The 2nd phase of the farm is expected to begin in August by cultivating 300,000 feddans, and the construction of a training centre for employees engaged in rice production. [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 2 Jul 79 p 3]

NEW REGIONAL MINISTERS--Khartoum, July 16, (SUNA)--The newly-appointed Regional Ministers and Commissioners were sworn-in yesterday before First Vice-President Abul Gasim Mohamed Ibrahim. The Sworn-in officials were: Justin Yak Arub, Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources; Lawrence Iwal Ewal, Minister of the High Executive Council Affairs; Martin Mager, Minister of Cooperation, Commerce and Supply. Samuel Renzi, adviser to the President of the High Executive Council; Jonathan Msiwal, Commissioner, Jonglei Province; and Jeeshwali Wal, Commissioner, Upper Nile Province. Present at the oath-taking ceremony were Vice-President Abel Alier, Peter Gatkouth, H.E.C. Vice-President and Ministers of Finance, Industry, Planning and Economy, Deputy Chief Justice Salah Ed Din Shibeika and Presidency State Minister Khalid El Khair. [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 15 Jul 79 p 6]

DAMAN OIL FIELD--Khartoum, July 16, (SUNA)--Ad Damam oil field started production with 1357 barrels per day a figure which jumped to 10,000 in a 12-month period, a well placed source told SUNA. In 1978 the source added the daily output shot to 2,579,563 barrels per day. The field total productivity nowadays total about 8,500,000 barrels per day. [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 16 Jul 79 p 8]

NEW ROAD IN SOUTH--Juba, August 3, (SUNA)--The Regional Department of Public Works, Transport and Roads is currently working on Kapoeta-Kenya road which will connect the Southern Region with the Kenyan port of Mombassa. Of the road, only 21 km from the Sudanese border remain to be finished by the end of the month. [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 3 Aug 79 p 3]

SUCCESSFUL DRILLING TESTS--Khartoum, Aug 5, (SUNA)--Charles W. Weinstock Abu Gabra Drilling Engineer announced yesterday morning that the drilling test in Abu Gabra well I, second layer, resulted in a crude gush averaging 300-350 barrels per day. In a press conference he held at the site, Mr Weinstock said that work will now begin in the installation of the drilling machine on Abu Gabra well II (about 50 meters to the east of Abu Gabra I) next Tuesday, in preparations for the beginning of drilling operations there in a week's time. Meanwhile work has been completed in Abu Gabra Well I. It is to be recalled that the first layer of Abu Gabra Well I began production with a daily output of 560 barrels. A press delegation comprising representatives of daily newspapers, Radio Omdurman, Sudan T.V. and the Sudan News Agency returned here yesterday evening after covering the event. [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 5 Aug 79 p 2]

SINO-SUDANESE TRADE EXCHANGE--Khartoum, Aug 7 (SUNA)--People's China and Sudan have concluded a \$90-million Trade Protocol Deal for 1979/80 compared with 26 million dollars in 1969. According to the deal, Sudan will import from China building materials, machines, tea, rice, medicines and paper and will export, cotton, sesame, groundnuts and gum arabic. Signing for Sudan, Cooperation, Commerce and Supply Minister, Faruq Al Maghbool commended China's contribution to Sudan's economic plans. People's China Ambassador here who signed for his country stressed the keenness of China to strengthen fraternal ties with Sudan. [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 7 Aug 79 p 1]

PLANS FOR DAIRY PROJECTS--Khartoum, Aug 8 (SUNA)--An Irish delegation is now here for talks with agriculture officials on implementation of dairy cooperative project in the Gezira Province. The Ls. 1.5 million project will take four years to implement and will be carried out by the Sudanese and Irish governments. Ireland will present technical assistance to the project. It will make available equipment needed for milk processing and distribution. According to the project's agreement, Ireland will be responsible for construction of buildings and provision of vehicles. Some 400 farmers will benefit from the project that will present all sorts of veterinary and agricultural services. Agriculture Minister had signed last May an agreement in this connection with his Irish counterpart. The Irish Government had expressed readiness to help establish an animal production institute in Sudan and a centre for animal production research at Shukkaba, Blue Nile Province. Technical and financial assistance was promised by Ireland for the Gezira University farm. It will as well outline a national programme for animal breeding in Sudan. [Khartoum SUNA BULLETIN in English 8 Aug 79 pp 2,3]

SDAR MINISTER DISCUSSES POLISARIO'S STRUGGLE

Nairobi SUNDAY NATION in English 26 Aug 79 pp 5, 26

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR), Hakim Ibrahim, in Nairobi last week by John Esibi]

[Text]

Q. Could you perhaps start by explaining the purpose of your current visit to Kenya and how successful or unsuccessful would you say the visit has been.

A. The purpose of my current visit first of all is to thank the Government and the people of Kenya for the support they have continued to give the people and the government of Polisario. We wished to do this especially so, for the stand Kenya recently took during the OAU Heads of State Summit in Monrovia, Liberia.

We consider it our duty to keep on pressing for support from our brothers all over Africa, because we believe that our struggle is the struggle for the entire continent. This is because it is a struggle against expansionism. We do not forget even a moment that Kenya itself did once struggle for her political independence just in the same manner as the Polisario are doing.

Q. As we conduct this interview, it is our understanding that up to now already 26 countries have recognised your government. Is Kenya included?

A. Kenya has always supported our struggle, and therefore we strongly hope that she will be the 27th country to recognise our country. We believe that this recognition will be logical.

All the same the Polisario people have very high regard for their brothers in Kenya. We believe that the war is soon going to come to an end, and finally our people will be politically free.

Q. What of the position of Mauritania as one of your immediate neighbour. Has she agreed to join you in the fight against Morocco or has she just chosen to remain non-committal during your struggle?

A. Mauritania has recognised the Polisario Front as the sole representative of Western Sahara people. In fact militarily it is the Polisario Front that actively defends Mauritania. This is because the Moroccan plan for expansionism will eventually engulf Mauritania as well, if it succeeds.

Q. But why didn't Polisario take over those areas formerly occupied by Mauritania, and instead chose to allow Morocco to move in?

A. The Polisario Front has liberated most of the Western Sahara. It is just a question of "tactics". Morocco has only occupied a town in Western Sahara. And the tactics that Polisario chose to use was first to liberate the entire area then turn to the town itself. It would not have been wise for Polisario to start struggling for the town itself as it is very important in the supplies of essential foodstuffs, water, etc.

It is better to go round and finally strangle the enemy. And I can assure you that is what is going to happen finally.

Q. It is claimed in other quarters that the Polisario's non-recognition by the OAU is as a result of the fact that yours is a government, in an exile. If that assertion is acceptable to you as well, then why don't you dissolve your present government and just choose to remain a mere liberation movement as to get recognition?

A. First of all I would like to refute that we are a government in "exile". We have already liberated most parts of the country Administratively, and militarily we are already in control.

Obviously the diplomatic struggle is being waged abroad. At the moment we are still pressing the OAU to recognise us and it is only logical that they do that. I must as well add here that the OAU has already recognised the right of the Polisario people to liberate themselves. In other words, the OAU has refused to recognise the counter movement by Morocco of expansion. This is illustrated by the fact that Morocco has at the moment elected to quit the OAU.

Morocco has elected to provoke and rebel against the OAU, but we in Polisario do co-operate with this only legitimate political movement in Africa. We are very optimistic that we will be admitted to the OAU during the next session.

Q. But before you can dream of first being admitted to the OAU during the next session, can you confirm here that the OAU has in fact recognised your government apart from just sympathising with your

struggle? Has the OAU officially recognised your government?

A. The OAU hasn't yet recognised the government, but it seems it will soon do that.

Q. Which means officially you are not recognised?

A. Not yet officially, but tactically they have, I would say. This is so first, because the OAU has already recognised the right for the Polisario people to achieve the independence. Secondly, we do hope the OAU will accord us recognition as they have already condemned the Moroccan *de facto* expansion.

This is also an indicative with the fact that already more than 20 African nations have recognised us, and we do still hope for many more to follow suit.

Q. For how long do you think the struggle will be continued? In other words when do you finally have to achieve your struggle?

A. The war is still on... and therefore no one can tell when we shall get through it. All I can tell you is that even if the struggle lasts for one more 100 years to come, it is our struggle and we will continue with it. The "struggle continues".

I have a son aged about eight now... and I think that a nine years' time he too will be a member of the Polisario liberation army, already to defend his country. This is the attitude which is going to happen from generation to generation to come.

Q. What is the area you are still struggling to liberate, and would you confirm or deny here that you are getting assistance from outside countries such as France, the USA etc?

A. We have already liberated most of the country with only a very small part left. And we are going to end this when we finally suffocate the Moroccan Army.

You only need to witness the kind of resistance the Polisario army has put on in confrontation with the Moroccan Army. What we would wish at the moment is to stay right away from this conflict.

The only kind of assistance France in particular would give is to try and find out the final solution to this problem. Another second kind of assistance we would wish to obtain from France, the US or any other super power would be in the form of aid as we still need aid to develop our country.

We are being realistic in demanding this. Unfortunately the struggle that is going on runs contrary to the development of the region. This is why we are appealing to all concerned to end this war. We would wish the war to come to an end so that we can concentrate to the development of the area. Asking for more arms in the region is just like adding more fuel to the already burning fire.

Q. You claim that you have liberated most of the parts in your country. Yet at the same time it is undisputed fact that most of the Polisario people are currently living in camps as refugees somewhere in Algeria. How can you claim to be in control whereas your own people are living in exile?

A. It is true that we do have our people living in Algeria as refugees. But it is equally true that these are the people that had ran away from the Moroccan genocide. Again these are just the people at the border between us and Morocco. But these people you term as refugees also do take part in the struggle. They are what one could term active but not passive refugees.

Q. But any government worth its salt must be of the people, with the people and for the people. In your case most of the people, it is alleged, have fled to Algeria and they are living in exile. How can you therefore claim to be effectively in control without the people?

A. It is not true that all the people have fled to Algeria. It is true we do have our people there, but these are only the minority. It is only a very small number of the people we are talking here about.

There are people in the already liberated areas, and there are also a few in the land still to be liberated. One thing I would ~~not~~ like to let you know is that it is the people who are waging the struggle. It is they that are fighting the war and therefore whether Morocco likes it or not, the people will have to decide.

Q. Has Polisario taken the struggle to the Arab League for support as well, and if the answer

is in affirmative, how many Arab countries would you list are behind your struggle?

A. There are seven Arab countries that have already recognised us, but, however, you must not forget that ours isn't an Arab, but an African struggle on the African continent. The Western Sahara people are very envious of other African people and therefore would like to remain Africans as well.

This is one reason why they have not taken the problem to the Arab League. They have always taken their problem to the right quarters, the OAU.

The Arab League is very far from them. It is an African problem on an African land, and a problem therefore of an African people.

CSO: 4420

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

OFFICIALS PRAISE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE MEMBERS

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 7 Aug 79 pp 1, 7

[Article: "The Reconstitution of the Supreme Reform Committee Results From Our Total Conviction of the Necessity of Reform"]

[Text] The day before yesterday, President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Lt Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih met in the afternoon with the secretary general, assistant secretary general, and members of the Supreme Committee for Fiscal and Administrative Reform. The President opened this meeting in the name of God and the people, and said, "It makes me very happy to meet today with the reform officials and personnel to whom we have given responsibility. We trust that they will help and share in bearing their patriotic responsibility faithfully, sincerely and firmly. We have decided to reconstitute the Supreme Committee for Fiscal and Administrative Reform out of our complete conviction in the necessity for reform and sharing responsibility without distraction or exaggeration.

"We reject falsehood, deceit and duplicity. We wanted very much to choose members for the supreme committee who would be honorable, loyal elements whose total loyalty would be to God and country. I hope to God that we will be successful in this choice.

"My brothers, you must all live up to the trust the leadership has in you. Our people are pinning great hopes on you in this respect. The opportunity to work and succeed is available. I shall stand alongside you in the same trench to combat corruption, horseplay, chaos and negative attitudes, so we can all help build the modern state, the state of law and order, and achieve everything the masses of our great people aspire to. This cannot be achieved unless the reform personnel perform their tasks and duties in eliminating fiscal and administrative corruption and practically applying the principles of reward and punishment, putting the right man in the right place, control, logical evaluation, cleanness of employers and officials, and the all-inclusiveness of reform for small and big persons, not just for the small or for petty violations and thefts. You must work to avoid the negative aspects of the reform experiment in the past and to benefit from its positive aspects. The 13 June movement and reform in general are not the product of individuals, but are the creation of this pure people who created September, who stood firm in their mountains

against all plots and provocations. The course of reform, brothers, is open to participation by national expertise and skills in building our country and turning it towards the better. The only condition for those selected for membership in the reform committee is loyalty to the nation--people and land--and belief in the goals of September in word, conduct and action. Similarly, the lack of complaining or criticism of mistakes, along with willingness or ability to overcome them, indicates inability or treachery. If these qualities in individuals are exploited or used by others to carry out destructive acts and deepen the corruption, they are a tool for sabotage and destruction, not a tool for construction and organization, which cannot live except in an unhealthy atmosphere. You must work harder and more sincerely so as to enable our country to join the caravan of advanced civilization, and so that we can achieve for our people the life of growth, freedom, progress, democracy and unity that they aspire to. I thank you and wish you success in your work. May God see that you succeed in what will benefit our country and its development. Peace be with you."

Secretary General of the Supreme Committee for Fiscal and Administrative Reform Husayn al-Muqaddami thanked the president for this opportunity to meet with the reform personnel, and for his sincerity, clarity and desire that others share the responsibility out of a patriotic motivation and a feeling that the duty is everyone's duty, just as the nation is everyone's nation. He also said, "O President, your opening your heart to welcome all those sons of the people who pay no attention to the words of the rumormongers and skeptics confirms the goodness of your intentions, your courage, and your confidence in the loyal sons of your people, and increases our determination and intent to achieve all the goals of reform and to create the modern state, the state of law and order. Also, this speech of yours will have a great effect on us, and will be a strong motivation for us to bear our patriotic responsibility sincerely and devotedly, especially since you have given everyone the opportunity to effectively participate in building the nation without pride, hypocrisy or exaggeration. We truly pledge to God that we will work with you and our people in love, faithfulness, seriousness and positiveness, aware of our responsibility to achieve for our people all their hopes and aspirations."

Then Assistant Secretary General of the Supreme Reform Committee Lt Col Ahmad al-Rahumi said, "Permit me to add my gratitude for your clarity and frankness, for giving the green light to the reform procession, and for your elucidation of the patriotic tasks and duties, especially since from the time of the supreme committee's establishment until now there has been no definition of its concept's outlines. I trust that we will live up to your valued trust in our ability to carry out our trust and bear our responsibility honorably, seriously and devotedly."

The meeting lasted six hours.

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